Iran: All nuclear materials and activities have been declared and verified to the IAEA

According to the Foreign Policy Group of Fars News Agency, the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, in response to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and safeguards reports of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding Iranian nuclear activities. published an explanation.

According to Fars report, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Raphael Grossi, expressed concern in his report that it seems that Iran has stopped the implementation of the March joint statement regarding the reinstallation of the agency’s monitoring equipment. . In this quarterly report, Grossi also claimed that Iran’s action in preventing the activity of several inspectors with the experience of the International Atomic Energy Agency was done in a way that seriously interfered with the agency’s ability to carry out verification activities. (Read here)

On the other hand, the three European countries that are parties to the JCPOA made a statement on Thursday at the meeting of the Board of Governors of the Atomic Energy Agency. They read a message about Iran’s nuclear program. In this statement, France, England, and Germany have accused Iran of not adhering to the agreement, regardless of the three countries’ reneging on their obligations to compensate for the effects of America’s withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2017.

Following the publication of the reports of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Board of Governors on November 15, 2023, the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, in response Regarding the JCPOA and safeguards reports, the Director General of the Agency announced his comments and considerations regarding Iranian nuclear activities in the form of an explanatory note which is below. Comments and considerations of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding Director General to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency with the titles: “NPT safeguards agreement of the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2023/58, 15 November 2023)” and “Monitoring and verification in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of Resolution 2231 (2015) United Nations Security Council (GOV/2023/57, 15 November 2023)”
The Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office and other international organizations based in Vienna would like to express its comments and observations as follows regarding Share the Director-General’s reports to the IAEA Board of Governors contained in GOV/2023/58 and GOV/2023/57:
A- General Comments

Article 2 of the Safeguards Agreement Jame (CSA) states: “The Agency shall have the right and obligation to ensure, in accordance with the terms of the said agreement, all source material or special fissile material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of Iran, under the jurisdiction of that country or under Its control at any point will be safeguarded with the sole purpose of verifying that such material has not been diverted to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Therefore, any expansion of verification measures on non-nuclear materials and activities beyond the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) is not legally justified. and the three European countries, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, in implementing their commitments, Iran, based on paragraphs 26 and 36 of the JCPOA, has taken all voluntary clarifying measures beyond its Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement, including the implementation of Amendment Code 3.1 (as in paragraph 65 of Annex I JCPOA has been specified).

* Iran’s decision to stop implementing its obligations under the JCPOA in accordance with inherent rights It was according to paragraphs 26 and 36 of JCPOA

The recent letter of three European countries, Germany, France and England, to the President of the Security Council on November 14, 2023, by closing Eye on the main cause of the current situation surrounding the JCPOA is deliberately spreading false information about Iran’s obligations under the JCPOA and its peaceful nuclear program. Iran’s decision to stop implementing its obligations under the JCPOA was completely in accordance with its inherent rights according to Articles 26 and 36 of the JCPOA and in response to the illegal withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA, along with the inability of three European countries, Germany, France, and England, to adhere to their commitments. This obvious fact cannot in any way be a basis for the three European countries Germany, France and England to refrain from fulfilling their obligations.

Fulfilling their commitments to cancel their sanctions specified in paragraph 20 of Annex V of the JCPOA on the transition day (October 18, 2023), is an illegal act and another clear example of their significant failure to fulfill their commitments in violation of the JCPOA and UN Security Council Resolution 2231.

As ​​for the issue of the so-called two places, it should be emphasized that the origin of the issue goes back to the claims made mainly by a malicious third party, the Israeli regime, which committed to It has none of the documents of mass destruction, including especially the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and has repeatedly threatened to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities and facilities dedicated to peaceful purposes, which is contrary to several resolutions of the Security Council, including especially Resolutions No. 407. 1983; 444, 1985; 475, 1987 and 939, 1990, none of which have been respected by this regime. This regime has been so brazen that it recently threatened Iran with a nuclear attack. In a statement that was broadcast live around the world, Netanyahu said: “Iran must face a credible nuclear threat” and his heritage minister also said: “A nuclear bomb will be one of the options to attack Hamas.” It should be noted. Due to greater cooperation with the Agency in recent years, Iran has implemented voluntary measures in the framework of several joint statements, including the joint statement of 13 Esfand 1401 (March 4, 2023).

B- Comments on the background section of the NPT safeguards report:

In paragraph 2 of the safeguards report, which states: “Comprehensive assessment of all information available to the agency related to safeguards to ensure That there is no indication of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities, no indication of production or processing of undeclared nuclear material at off-facility (LOF) facilities and locations, and no indication of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State of Possession There is no Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement, it is necessary”, the following observations should be taken into account:

Refer to the agency in the 4 report GOV/2023/5 about those countries that have a Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement (CSA) and the Additional Protocol (AP) are applicable, as reflected in the annual Safeguards Implementation Reports (SIR): “To ensure that there are no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in a country, the Agency It should assess the compatibility of the country’s declared nuclear program with the results of the Agency’s verification activities under the relevant safeguards agreements and additional protocols….” In several cases, the agency has adopted a different position that does not correspond to the mentioned contents. Such an approach is neither legal nor professionally justified, taking into account the contents and spirit of the aforementioned materials.

The Director General on various occasions in his report using words such as “serious concern/ Deep/significant” which is not objective, professional and has no technical justification, but rather a political approach that should have been avoided. Director General’s reference to “inadequate basic cooperation” has completely ignored Iran’s cooperation with the Agency in various fields, including in relation to joint statements.

* There are no places under the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement that require declaration

in paragraph 6 of the report (GOV/2023/58 is: “…safeguard issues related to these three undeclared locations are considered to remain due to Iran’s insufficient basic cooperation, despite numerous interactions with the Agency.” dated 14 September 2023, INFCIRC/996 dated 7 June 2022 and INFCIRC/967 dated 3 December 2021 emphasized that there were no locations under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) that required notification. Furthermore, the Agency’s claim of location Undeclared is not supported by the submission of credible safeguards-related information, documents, and evidence. “Marivan is consistent with Iran conducting explosive tests with shielding in preparation for the use of neutron detectors (Paragraph 20, GOV/2022/26).”

On the non-security issue of “explosive tests”, by changing “… may have planned…” to “… planned” and more recently to “… test has done…” (paragraph 13 GOV/2022/26, paragraph 4, GOV/2023/9 and also subtitle 12 GOV/2023/58) we can understand the gradual evolution of the Agency’s literature in the so-called Marivan place. This type of inference by the Director General is not only irrelevant to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) but also contradicts the letter and spirit of the March 4, 2023 Joint Statement. Iran’s comments and explanations regarding paragraph 8 of the report “… the Agency’s assessment of the activities that Iran carried out in Marivan remains unchanged” have already been reflected in paragraph 8 of INFCIRC/1094.

C. Comments on the “Remaining safeguards issues” section of the report (GOV/2023/58) /p>

In the case of paragraph 9 in the case of Turquzabad, it is necessary to pay attention to the following points.

The agency’s assessment is not based on valid information and evidence. Torquzabad is actually an industrial place that includes all kinds of warehouses for storing detergents, chemicals, food, fabrics and textiles, tires and auto parts, pipes and fittings and some industrial waste. This place in such an area is not suitable for storing nuclear materials.

As ​​it has been repeatedly said, the place in question is an industrial waste warehouse where moving containers is an unavoidable necessity. The movement of containers from an industrial zone is only evidence for the agency’s claim and cannot be considered as a solid basis for any claim. Therefore, the charge of moving nuclear materials and equipment cannot be considered as a solid basis.

Islamic Republic of Iran in the field of conducting extensive research on the history of activities carried out in this place, the source of particles Reported by the agency did not find. There has been no nuclear storage or activity at this location. Therefore, no technical clues were found regarding the origin of the reported particles. However, the possibility of the presence of such particles through sabotage cannot be ruled out. which proves that the agency’s assumption is incorrect has already been presented to the agency. Torquzabad…”, it should be emphasized that:

Using the term “nuclear material particles” instead of “uranium particles” in the previous report (GOV/2023/26) reflected, leads to misinterpretation. The mere presence of a few uranium particles in the claimed locations, which may be found anywhere in a country, should not be considered as a matter of safeguards. “The agency identified a discrepancy regarding the amount of nuclear material that needs to be resolved.” It should be noted that:

The background of the discrepancy is explained in the explanatory note INFCIRC/1131 dated September 14, 2023. Regarding this issue, two technical meetings between the Agency and Iran were held in Vienna in September and November 2023, and further verification activities of the Agency are expected in the near future.

While the issue only refers to the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement (CSA), for unknown reasons it is also reflected unrelatedly in subtitle 22 of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Report (GOV/2023/57).

d. Comments on the “Joint Statement” section of the report

Regarding paragraph 24 of the report, it should be noted that the first paragraph of the joint statement specifies that Iran’s cooperation with the Agency is within the framework of Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement (CSA) Any further cooperation shall be mutually agreed upon in the manner outlined in the joint statement. In this regard, Iran agreed to the installation of cameras in the Isfahan workshop by the agency without access to the collected data. Obviously, any other action requires an agreement on the modality.

* Iran’s right to Objecting to the cancellation of the appointment of agency inspectors, not only at the time of the appointment proposal, but also at any time after the appointment The appointment of IAEA inspectors should take into account the following facts:

As ​​stated in Article 9 (a)(ii) of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) between Iran and IAEA (INFCIRC/214). It has been clearly stated that Iran reserves its sovereign right to protest against the cancellation of the appointment of the agency’s inspectors, not only at the time of the appointment proposal, but at any time after their appointment.

* The list of inspectors appointed for Iran currently includes 119 people / Iran agrees to appoint 8 new inspectors proposed by the Agency

Exercising this right will not directly or indirectly affect the Agency’s ability to carry out its inspections in Iran. The Director General’s claim that “possible dangers prevent inspection as described in Article 9(a)(iii) of the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement (CSA)” is baseless and has no value. Needless to say, the list of appointed inspectors for Iran currently includes 119 people, which is a very high number. It should be noted that in a letter to the Director General on October 30, 2023, Iran announced its agreement with the appointment of 8 new inspectors proposed by the agency.

e. Comments on the report “Summary” section (GOV/2023/58)

While our cooperation with the Agency is on the right track, the report expresses regret for which is still ongoing, is inconclusive

Regarding the implementation of the amendment code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangements, there is no need to mention that the implementation of the amendment code 3.1 was part of the transparency and confidence building measures that Clause 65 of the annex of JCPOA is reflected. This action was suspended based on Articles 26 and 36 of the JCPOA after the withdrawal of the United States from this agreement. and related nuclear activities” to Iran, and Iran was not and is not obligated to consider non-genuine and fabricated documents as information related to safeguards and to respond to the agency’s requests; However, Iran voluntarily granted access to the agency and provided information and explanations about these locations. considers it valid and this caused the agency to conclude a wrong and unreliable assessment based on this. The agency should avoid this attitude.

The director general’s reference to the joint statement (paragraph 40) regarding the commitment is incomplete and incorrect, because Iran has not accepted any specific commitment without a bilateral agreement. Is. The joint statement by Iran has not led to a frozen deadlock, but because of the agency’s unwillingness to participate in the modality discussion that requires agreement.

* The director general should publish a real and not emotional report

in paragraph 41 “Director General It also strongly condemns Iran’s sudden cancellation of the appointment of several experienced IAEA inspectors. Therefore, the phrase “strongly condemns” is not professional and should be avoided in his future reports. Reports with political and non-constructive motivations are reflected, stating that they criticize and condemn Iran exclusively for exercising its legitimate rights.

The preamble contradicts the March 4, 2023 joint statement in which the agency committed to engage with Iran in full compliance with its rights under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA). Any attempt to deny or violate Iran’s sovereign rights is categorically rejected. The use of Iran’s inalienable right must be fully recognized and respected.

The joint declaration is voluntary in itself and no voluntary action on the part of the other side should go beyond the established principle of international law. It can be defined and implemented as it likes. In addition, voluntary actions are subject to agreement on modality.

* All materials and activities Iran’s nuclear program has been fully declared to the agency

and. Conclusion

The Islamic Republic of Iran has so far provided its full cooperation within the framework of the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement (CSA) with the Agency. It should be emphasized again that all of Iran’s nuclear materials and activities have been fully disclosed to the IAEA and verified by it. To carry out verification in Iran based on the principles of impartiality, professionally and objectively.
It should be emphasized again that all the nuclear materials and activities of Iran have been fully declared to the Agency and passed through a very strong verification system.

Although the Islamic Republic of Iran has no obligation to answer the agency’s questions based on fake and invalid documents, however, Iran has voluntarily provided all necessary information, supporting documents and has provided the Agency with requested access.

The Agency should not link providing assurances about the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program to increasing its knowledge of Iran’s non-nuclear activities.

The Islamic Republic of Iran once again emphasizes the importance and value of extensive cooperation with the Agency. This constructive cooperation should not be undermined by short-sighted political interests. Accordingly, the Agency has a responsibility to exercise reasonable discretion in addressing such issues in a diligent manner to avoid distorting the larger picture of cooperation between Iran and the Agency. In principle, invalid, fake and fictitious information should not be used as a basis for verification.

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