A look at why it is necessary for Europe to review its political and security relations with America

According to the report of the international group Tasnim news agency, publication ” Germany’s Day Site” in an article written by Jeff Rathke, head of the American-German Institute at Johns Hopkins University and a former US diplomat and a NATO official, and Theresa Lutkefand, assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense Program in Washington, DC and a non-member. The resident of the Institute of Global Public Policy in Berlin wrote: Germany and its European allies must reorganize their security policy relations with the United States. Their protective shield is increasingly strained.

Read more: Who will determine the direction of US foreign policy in the coming year? Kurdish and what does this mean for NATO? Many politicians in Europe are concerned about this issue. After Donald Trump won the Republican primaries in Iowa and New Hampshire, the possibility of his re-nomination as the Republican presidential candidate increases. This is also shown by his clear lead in all polls in states that will hold their primaries in the coming weeks. Despite all the legal, civil and even constitutional obstacles, Trump will likely fight again with Joe Biden of the Democratic Party to enter the White House.

Is: Of course, it is still too early to accept with certainty the possibility of Trump’s re-election, but the possibility of Trump’s return to power should immediately force Germany and its European partners to review the current European security structure. In less than a year, Europe’s most important ally could once again be led by a politician deeply hostile to NATO and some European countries, especially Germany. During his last term in office, Trump apparently refused to withdraw from the NATO military alliance only because centrist advisers advised him not to. If he resumes the presidency, it can be assumed that there will be no room left for such voices in his team.

From the results of the US presidential election in November, the reduction of the transatlantic security imbalance that has existed for years is in favor of Germany and Europe. The time when the United States dominated the global security structure and could bear disproportionate burdens is over. They are no longer capable of simultaneously maintaining all-out military activity in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The war in Ukraine and the Middle East, along with Russia’s aggressive trend and China’s growing ambitions, have strained America’s capabilities. place within the coalition on a new basis. It is necessary that European member states take on more duties and costs. The coalition will make important defense planning decisions in the next few months, giving it an opportunity to redefine transatlantic defense and roles.

US strategists There is growing concern that US conventional forces, designed for a major war with a similarly powerful adversary, will no longer be able to sustain a deterrence strategy in Europe and Asia. Some experts, military officials and politicians conclude that the United States should reduce its involvement in Europe to focus fully on the challenge in Asia.

These grievances stem from the unfair distribution of costs and burdens. The end of the Cold War has led to lower defense budgets in the West since 1990. In 2014, NATO members agreed to spend two percent of their gross domestic product on the armed forces. It might have been appropriate at the time. But since Russia’s massive war against Ukraine, this is no longer enough. Russia is investing heavily in its military – in the next year alone, almost a third of the country’s government budget will be spent on defense. This should leave no doubt about the ongoing threat to Europe. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius warned last week that Russia could attack a NATO country within the next five to eight years.

Germany is often the center of attention. The US has come under fire for decades of underinvestment in its armed forces — especially as Donald Trump lashed out at Berlin during his first term in office. Germany is now trying to achieve NATO’s two percent goal. Raising more money for defense, but also spending these additional financial resources in such a way that governments can respond appropriately to the new dynamics of international security. Because a higher level of spending in Europe alone does not guarantee that the United States can and will continue to be active in the Indo-Pacific region and maintain a protective shield over Europe. The challenge is to strengthen Europe’s deterrence and defense position against Russia in such a way that, firstly, it is reliable even if the US involvement is reduced, and secondly, it addresses the basic concerns of American strategists.

European allies could ease U.S. concerns about the overuse of their capabilities by finally making a credible commitment to end NATO’s overreliance on some scarce U.S. military capabilities. In the event of a crisis in Asia, the Pentagon needs military equipment and weapons such as air defense, suppression of enemy air defenses, air refueling, as well as intelligence gathering and reconnaissance, which is not available in this coalition. European members of NATO are still too dependent on the United States.

It is a principle of NATO defense planning that no alliance partner should be responsible for providing more than 50 percentage of a certain ability. In reality, however, the United States typically carries a much larger share of the burden in NATO for many capabilities. But it doesn’t have to be that way. Because Europe certainly has the technological and industrial capacity to provide many of these skills.

Now is the time for Europeans to act. In the coming months, NATO will define its so-called minimum capability requirements. This important step in defense planning sets the minimum level of capabilities that the alliance must have to ensure its ability to outperform a nuclear-armed adversary.

The Europeans must bear most of this burden and must make this political and defense planning commitment now in order to achieve results within a few years. Agreeing on an ambitious plan in the coming months will commit allies for years and form the basis for future national procurement and budget decisions.

The federal government in Berlin now It has the opportunity to proactively shape transatlantic negotiations with Germany and Europe’s security interests in mind, rather than perhaps being driven by the outcome of the US presidential election. This is an opportune moment for Berlin to return to a traditional unifying role and reinvigorate security efforts across Europe.

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