Israel and Russia; Tel Aviv’s deep orientation towards the West at the cost of ending friendship with Moscow?

According to the international group Tasnim news agency, Moscow’s closeness with Hamas and The subsequent straining of relations with the Zionist regime shows the abandonment of one of Russia’s long-standing strategies in the Middle East, which is to play an effective role in regional crises as a mediating force and accepted among all regional powers. The change in the Kremlin’s strategy and policies in the Middle East after the start of the Ukraine war and the need to support and attract the votes of the countries of the global South on the one hand and the strong confrontation with the policies of the United States on the other hand made Moscow stand alongside the countries of the region in the challenges of the Middle East.

The Zionist regime has been one of Russia’s most important partners in the Middle East for the past few decades, but in the midst of the Gaza war and Moscow’s approach to Hamas and support for the defenseless people of Gaza, the relationship between the two sides has reached its lowest point. reached its level in recent years and these relations are experiencing their most severe crisis in recent years. In addition, Moscow’s relations with some countries in the region have made it very difficult for the Kremlin to play the role of a mediator in West Asia.

Special relations

Relations between Moscow and Tel Aviv have seen many fluctuations. During the 1967 Six-Day War, the Soviet Union, then an ally of the Arab states, severed ties with Israel for almost a quarter of a century. But at the turn of the century, bilateral relations began to improve rapidly. Russia and Israel have become as close to each other as possible in the last ten years under the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who calls himself a close friend of Vladimir Putin.

Tel Aviv’s goal was clear, he was convinced Convincing voters that Netanyahu’s personal ties to the Kremlin will ensure Israel’s security, especially in the face of Russia’s intervention in Syria that began in 2015. Netanyahu has long insisted that it was his “friendship and personal relationship” with Putin that prevented Russia from actively supporting Iran in Damascus, as well as ensuring Moscow’s non-interference in Israeli attacks on Iranian targets in Syria.

All this led to the fact that Israel, unlike the West, did not change its approach to Russia even after the Russian army invaded Ukraine. The regime’s cabinet did not impose sanctions against Moscow. Moreover, when it came to attacks on Ukraine, Netanyahu and his cabinet avoided directly condemning the Kremlin. Not only did Israel refuse to cut ties with Moscow, but in the second half of 2023, it expanded its cooperation with Russia in less sensitive areas such as cultural fields.

Israel was one of the few allies of the United States willing to engage diplomatically and economically with Russia, and this significantly mitigated the negative consequences of Western sanctions for Moscow. reduced After Western sanctions were imposed, Israel became the largest importer of certain beverages from Russia, and Russian companies such as Yandex expanded their operations in Tel Aviv. Also, some Russian figures who were arrested under Western sanctions were able to travel to Europe without a visa by using the identity documents issued for them in Tel Aviv. He had goals in mind. After increasing its role in Syria in 2015, Moscow sought to build relations with all actors in West Asia. This balancing act enabled Russia to be recognized as a great power and an essential mediator in the crises and challenges of West Asia.

But Moscow’s explicit support for Hamas after the start of the al-Aqsa storm operation on October 7 has changed everything. Moscow’s open support for Hamas in such circumstances cost Tel Aviv too much. After the visit of representatives of the Hamas movement to Moscow, the intelligence community of the Israeli regime considers Russia to be equal to the existential enemies of this regime, such as Iran and Hezbollah. Of course, Russia currently maintains its support for Hamas at the verbal and spiritual level, but this does not prevent it from considering the Zionist regime in Moscow as an ally of the Palestinian fighters.

Change in Middle East policies

In fact, Russia is the leader of the United Nations countries in condemning Israel’s military actions in Gaza and is currently among the most active critics of the actions. The Zionist regime in Gaza is continuous. For example, Vasily Nebenzia, Russia’s permanent representative to the United Nations, called Israel an occupier. For his part, the regime’s permanent representative, Gilad Erdan, accused Moscow of exploiting the Hamas attack for its own selfish purposes and trying to “distract the world’s attention from its invasion of Ukraine.” At the same time, this diplomat called Russia “the last country” that has the right to make moral recommendations to this child-killing regime. The foreign policy of Netanyahu has started to actively approach the United States and the Western world in general, and this means moving further away from Russia.

In recent years Netanyahu has tried to portray the Zionist regime as an independent power and to present himself as a leader who is able to communicate well with the leaders of the United States, China, India and Russia at the same time. But the post-October 7 world conditions and the current support of the United States and European leaders have increasingly convinced Israelis that they can only rely on the West. /strong>

Now the heads of the regime are trying to avoid disagreements with the United States and Western countries in the international arena in every possible way, so as not to lose their support during the military operations in Gaza. For example, it is no coincidence that on November 16, the regime’s banks listened to the recommendations of the European Union and imposed restrictions on accounts opened by Russians.

At the same time, Israel is still in It has not revised its policy towards Ukraine. There is still no talk about supplying weapons or imposing sanctions against Russia. First, it is unlikely that the Israelis will have a great desire to provide military assistance to a third party in a war situation in which they are trapped and in need of American military assistance. Secondly, the leaders of this regime do not want to completely stop the dialogue with Moscow, because it would allow the complete disconnection to lead to an increase in Moscow’s aid to countries and groups opposed to Israel.

In turn Considering its ability and opportunity to equip some of its allies in the Middle East, Russia is not in a hurry to provide offensive weapons to the opponents of the Zionist regime. Moscow’s understanding of such an action is to reach a point of no return in relations with the Zionist regime.

A photo of Musa Abu Marzouk’s meeting with the political leaders of Hamas (pictured on the right) with Mikhail Bogdanov, the special representative of the Russian president for Middle East affairs.

While bilateral relations have not yet been severed, a sudden cooling of relations between Russia and the occupying regime could quickly lead to unpredictable consequences in the region. For example, consider that the Zionist regime stopped warning Moscow before carrying out airstrikes in Syria. This will dramatically increase the risk of unwanted conflict between the two sides.

Also, the war in Ukraine has brought Russia closer to Iran. Proximity to Tehran and its allies will further strengthen the gap between Tel Aviv and Moscow.

Of course, Russia’s influence in the region is not limited to relations with the Zionist regime. But the tension in bilateral relations only shows the fact that after the start of the war in Ukraine, Moscow has increasingly changed the direction of its foreign policy, especially in the Middle East region, and seeks to redefine its position among the countries of the region.

Moscow’s closeness to Hamas and support for the discourse on the formation of an independent Palestinian state, the subsequent deterioration of relations with Israel, increased cooperation with Iran in commercial, military and security formats, as well as the expansion of strategic relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates Arabic as the two main partners of the United States in the Middle East region, and on the other hand, strengthening relations with Ankara as one of the most influential countries in the region and a member of NATO, in addition to attracting the support of countries in the global south, especially African countries, indicate a major strategic change in Russia’s foreign policy and revision Kremlin’s Middle East policies.

Author: Mehdi Saif Tabrizi, researcher of Russia and the Caucasus

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