Neither friend nor enemy: changing relations between Russia and Armenia in the shadow of Karabakh developments

According to the international group Tasnim news agency, Armenia is on the verge of developing a policy Foreigner is new. Moscow’s acquiescence during the Third Karabakh War, in which Azerbaijan recaptured the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh and forced all of its Armenians to flee, means that most Armenians no longer see Russia as a strategic ally and guarantor of their security. . This greatly increases the possibility of Yerevan turning to western structures and the desire to unite with regional powers such as Iran and India. At the same time, despite being far from Russia, Yerevan is still It will seek to maintain constructive relations with Moscow in some common areas, including energy and economy, and despite the trauma caused by the loss of Karabakh, efforts will continue to resolve the long-term conflict with Azerbaijan and normalize relations with Turkey.

Defenders of Armenians?

For both the Armenian elite and the general public, the events of Nagorno-Karabakh, which in their eyes The idea that Russia is the only protector and guarantor of Armenia’s security was nothing but ethnic cleansing and buried in public opinion. The opinion that Russia is the biggest security guarantor of Armenians has existed among Armenians for centuries in various forms and it goes back to at least the first quarter of the 19th century and forms part of the Armenian national identity to some extent. However, even if the crisis between the two countries is resolved today, the image of Russia in the minds of Armenians will never be the same again. It is not to underestimate or ignore the role of Russia in the Armenian society. The idea of ​​a Russian “big brother” contradicted reality whenever Russia not only did not help the Armenians, but also cooperated with their opponents. But after the passage of time the situation changed and Russia regained its place as an ally and protector in the worldview of the majority of Armenians.

For example, in the last years of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, Armenia had become a serious opponent of Moscow’s policies because it saw the Communist Party’s position on the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis close to Azerbaijan. However, since the mid-1990s and after independence, Armenia again considered Russia as a strategic ally.

It was officially believed that Yerevan had a multilateral foreign policy but it was obvious that the role of Russia is more important than others. Every time the interests of the parties conflicted with each other, the orientation towards Moscow was highlighted; For example, in 2013, under pressure from the Kremlin, Yerevan abandoned the Association Agreement with the European Union and announced its desire to join the Eurasian Economic Union.

Of course, always Armenians. There are those who have called for closer ties with the West, including through joining the European Union and NATO, but at least until the second Karabakh war in 2020, these calls were always on the sidelines. Even the Velvet Revolution of 2018, which brought Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to power, did not change the calculations and outlook of the Armenian elite’s foreign policy. The French President and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau found common ground, but did not raise the issue of changing the direction of foreign policy towards the West, and even then the Prime Minister repeated the issue that there is no need for a revolution and fundamental changes in Armenia’s foreign policy. Pashinyan even sent doctors and military engineers to Syria as part of Russia’s military intervention in support of Bashar al-Assad, causing the White House’s dissatisfaction with the policies undertaken by Armenia.

While the war 2020 showed that Yerevan was left alone in Karabakh internationally, Russia was able to maintain its credibility among Armenians by preventing the complete destruction of Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh and the deployment of peacekeeping forces, forcing Armenians to re- speak as a guarantor of security.

Only after February 2022 it became clear to Armenia that the status quo has become unstable. Russia, which was involved in the fronts of Ukraine, could no longer pay much attention to the South Caucasus, and relations with Baku and Ankara became more important for Moscow in the face of Western sanctions. However, political elites in Yerevan and Stepankert drew different conclusions from the new situation.

Since the spring of 2022, Yerevan has gradually distanced itself from Moscow, improved relations with the West, and prepared expressed for reconciliation regarding Karabagh. At the same time, Armenians increasingly realized that not only the independence of Karabakh, but even the maintenance of the status quo was simply not possible. In this situation, unlike Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which took a neutral position during the massive escalation of conflicts in September 2022, the West was ready to support Armenia’s security at least through diplomatic methods.

In Stepankert, they looked at the situation differently. There, many still trusted the Russian military and saw them as the only obstacle against a possible Azerbaijani attack. Both among the elite and among the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh, there was a strong and seemingly irrational confidence that Russia would not allow the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic to be destroyed.

This position It was also supported by the pro-Russian parliamentary opposition in Armenia. Until in August 2023, the change of the president of Nagorno-Karabakh was approved. Arayik Harotonian, who was considered to be close to Pashinyan, gave his place to Samuel Shahramanian, who was considered a pro-Russian force. This caused considerable enthusiasm among the anti-government and pro-Russian ranks in Yerevan and raised hopes of getting rid of Pashinyan in a similar way in Armenia.

However. , the one-day war in September 2023 and the subsequent exodus of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh made it clear even to pro-Russian Armenians that Russia was unable or unwilling to protect the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Russia did not even intervene to help the pro-Russian politicians of Nagorno-Karabakh. Having taken control of the region, Azerbaijani security forces arrested the former presidents of Nagorno-Karabakh, Arkady Ghokasyan, Baku Sahakyan and Arayik Harutunyan, as well as Ruben Vardanyan, a Russian-Armenian businessman who had moved to Nagorno-Karabakh.

As a result of the events of September, contrary to expectations, not only did not lead to the fall of the Pashinyan government in Armenia, but on the contrary, it severely weakened the pro-Russian opposition and the opponents of Pashinyan. The failure of the pro-Russian protests in September 2023 showed that the narrative that Russia and its pro-Armenian politicians were the main culprits of the Nagorno-Karabakh disaster is increasingly spreading in Armenia. This consensus is being formed in Armenian society that it is impossible to continue relations with Russia after the events in Karabakh.

Facing the West?

What will be the foreign policy of Armenia “after Russia”? First of all, the most serious problem of Armenia is still the conflict with Azerbaijan and its biggest supporter, Turkey. Since the capture of Karabagh, the Azerbaijani authorities continue to act aggressively in their statements towards Armenia, and on the other hand, Ilham Aliyev is in no hurry to sign any document on the normalization of relations between the two countries.

However, the events of September It further convinced Yerevan that it should look for a solution to the conflict with its neighbors. Therefore, the leadership of Armenia proposed the “Crossroads of Peace” project, which is supposed to replace the “Zangzor Corridor” project. So far, this plan has not generated much enthusiasm among Yerevan’s opposition, but the plan of this project will help to refute the accusation that Armenia is to blame for the closure of transit routes in the South Caucasus region.

Of course, Armenia hopes to adjust and change the current balance of power in the region, primarily through cooperation with The West sees Recent months have been unprecedented in terms of the level of activity and meetings of Armenian officials with Western leaders. In addition, security is currently one of the topics of conversation with the leaders of the European Parliament and France, a topic that they previously preferred not to discuss with the West. Yerevan has also made it clear that, unlike Baku, it prefers a Western platform rather than a Russian one to discuss the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

On the other hand, Yerevan understands that the upcoming process Going to the West comes with certain restrictions for this country. Armenia still depends on Russia in vital issues such as security, energy and transportation. It is naive to imagine that the West can quickly replace Russia in all these areas. It is also obvious that it is difficult to expect direct military assistance from the West in case of a new round of conflicts with Azerbaijan. It is likely that the matter will be limited to diplomatic pressure on Baku and sanctions, the effectiveness of which, of course, is completely uncertain.

Therefore, Yerevan is trying to be careful about new relations. Talk to the West. In his speech at the European Parliament, Pashinyan stated: “Armenia is ready to move closer to the European Union, as far as the European Union considers it possible.”

Some politicians and representatives Armenian civil society says that Armenia should join the European Union and NATO in the future, but the government officially prefers not to mention the possible entry or exit from the Collective Security Treaty or the Eurasian Economic Union.

Heading South

However, Yerevan does not want to repeat its past mistakes by relying too much on a strategic ally. sever its relations with Moscow and limit itself only to the West in order to find new partners. Regarding the events in Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku has repeatedly said that it supports the territorial integrity of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Iran has also expressed its opposition to the creation of an extraterritorial corridor through the south of Armenia that connects Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan region, and in this regard has unveiled the Aras Passage Project.

Republic of Azerbaijan and Iran have repeatedly clashed over the issue, and tensions eased only after Turkish and Azerbaijani officials announced in October that communications between the two countries would continue through Iran. In any case, Iran remains as a vital partner for Armenia. And therefore, in turning its foreign policy towards the west, Yerevan should definitely look at Tehran and consider Tehran’s interests in order not to provoke Iran in the region.

Another partner from the south. The world that Yerevan is India’s hope for. After the 2020 war, New Delhi became the focus of Armenia. When Azerbaijan was actively supported with weapons not only by Turkey and Israel but also by Pakistan in this war. Since then, relations between India and Armenia have started, including in the field of arms supply, and every day has seen significant progress.

Apart from ideological considerations, the most important reason for India’s interest in Armenia can be seen in the use of the trade corridor that connects this country to the Black Sea and trade with Europe through Iran and the region of Southern Armenia, or Sivnik Province. An important point to be noted here is that India’s potential involvement in the affairs of the Caucasus should not be overestimated. It is difficult and almost impossible to imagine India’s presence in the region and on the border of Armenia and Azerbaijan in case of escalation of tensions and conflicts.

However, none of Armenia’s new partners can or is ready to replace Russia. as a security guarantor for Yerevan. Armenia is also dependent on Russia for other issues such as energy and transportation. Yerevan’s reluctance to cut ties with Moscow completely is understandable. As many people of Yerevan repeat today; If we lose an ally in Russia, at least we should not find an enemy there. It is naive to think that the West can simply replace Russia in all these fields.

In Moscow, any step by Armenia towards the West is seen as a hostile action against Russia. and the Kremlin still has many levers to exert pressure or punish Yerevan. The Kremlin could give Baku the green light to launch another military operation against Armenia, stop natural gas exports, or deport Russian Armenians, for example.

Using radical measures, Although it will cause a lot of damage to Armenia, it will not help to return it to the Russian sphere of influence and will only lead to increased anti-Russian sentiments and a more active search for new Western partners. Moreover, Yerevan does not want an open conflict with Russia and tries to maintain at least the economic relations that are growing despite the political problems. There is much to hope that Moscow and Yerevan can overcome their current problems and establish a new relationship, or at least have a civilized divorce. But the history of Russia’s relations with other countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union shows that Moscow does not always behave rationally in such matters.

Author: Mehdi Seif Tabrizi, researcher on Russia and the Caucasus.

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