The relationship between economic motives and the political goals of Russia’s presence in Ukraine and activism in Syria

According to the report of the international group Tasnim news agency, in this article, The investigation of Russia’s motivations for its presence in Ukraine and its activism in Syria has been done not only with a political but also with an economic approach. It has also been tried to examine the prominence of Russia’s economic motives in Syria and Ukraine to investigate how these motives interact with Russia’s political goals. Moscow’s presence in the mentioned countries includes short-term economic goals or goals with a long-term approach. It should be noted that the political goals of Moscow’s presence should not be considered separate and separable from the long-term economic goals, which has been ignored in most analyses. However, the form and manner of Russia’s presence in Ukraine and what led to its entry into the field in Syria is not the subject of this article.

To clarify the relationship between political factors and long-term economic interests. , the main factors and drivers that have led to Moscow’s military presence in these countries are linked to an economic logic that provides a more accurate understanding of the interaction between political motivations and Russia’s long-term economic goals.

The content expressed is intended to express the dual logic of following and imitating the policy of the United States of America of presence in the countries of the region in pursuit of economic benefits and presence in the oil-rich countries that serve the national interests of the United States of America. The double logic that Russia, by being present in the countries that provide Moscow’s economic interests, seeks to obtain maximum benefits and highlight its presence in these countries.

Moscow’s economic interests in Syria:

Global energy is one of the main factors of Russia’s intervention in Syria, and Russia’s influence and control over It provides EU energy supply and facilitates Russia’s position as a dominant energy supplier that also controls distribution networks. Therefore, in the context of Syria, Russian intervention is useful for long-term political and commercial interests that may include future pipeline projects. between Russia’s foreign policy and perceptions of domestic economic performance.

Despite Russia’s domestic economic issues, what is largely absent from this body of literature is an appreciation of the motivations of It is the economic possibility that underlies Russia’s decision to have a military presence in Syria.

The importance of the Tartus naval facility in Syria, while it is Russia’s only port of access outside the borders of the Russian Federation, in Its usefulness lies in the logistics of the force, but it alone is not a sufficient reason for a military presence. Some analyzes consider oil and gas interests as the main factors for other countries to be present in Syria. Among these long-term goals is the importance of natural gas and gas-related infrastructure in Syria, particularly the planned construction of a $10 billion gas pipeline that will cross Iran, Iraq, and Syria.

If built, this pipeline (which is usually called the Islamic pipeline) will go from Iran’s Asalouye port near the South Pars gas field in the Persian Gulf, then cross Iraq and go through the eastern provinces to West) Deir Ezzor passes through Syria.

The cities of Deir ez-Zor, Homs and Tartus turn this pipeline into an assembly and production center before the gas is transported to the market through Lebanon as well as Banias, Syria. An agreement between the governments of Syria, Iran and Iraq to build the pipeline was signed in July 2011, shortly after the start of the Syrian civil war. This pipeline will go from Qatar’s northern field through Syrian territory to Turkey for further export to the European Union.

This gas pipeline narrative is more about Russia’s preference for an Islamic pipeline compared to The proposed project is focused on Qatar. The pipeline could help Russia control gas exports to Europe from the region, where Russia is the main supplier of solid fuels, crude oil and natural gas to the lucrative EU markets.

Moscow’s economic interests in Ukraine:

On the other hand, Russia’s economic interests in Ukraine can be described in Russia’s use of counter-sanctions and import substitution strategies in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, which has led to an overall “securitization” of economic policy in Russia.

Two years after the Russia-Ukraine war, Russia is still facing an unprecedented number of economic sanctions. To circumvent its oil export restrictions, Moscow has increasingly resorted to a fleet of ships called the Ghost Fleet. They have not left a trace and have no clear ownership. These tankers have been traveling without the required insurance policies, and despite Western sanctions, they are still allowed to sell Russian oil to the world. This issue is among the concerns of the West in the invincibility of the Russian economy in the Ukraine crisis and the role and economic position of Russia. In general, perhaps the most important motive for Moscow’s activity in Syria is the potential of using of the crisis as a tool to put pressure on the West to accept the annexation of Crimea and the removal of economic sanctions against Russia.

Moscow takes the leadership role in crises by decisively intervening in the region. and showed the world that more than the United States and other Western powers are willing to do what is necessary to solve the problem. With its extensive military presence in Syria, Russia ensures that any possible diplomatic and military solution must be done in cooperation with Moscow, forcing the West to cooperate with the Putin regime.

Russia with Using its key role in the region as leverage, it will likely seek to disrupt and perhaps even remove Western sanctions against its economy.

In many ways, Russia’s activities in Ukraine and Syria have similar driving factors. Just as the intervention in Ukraine was largely due to the fear of Western political encroachment on Moscow’s sphere of influence, Russia’s presence in Syria was also due to the need to protect a key coalition government in Syria.

Maintaining key naval assets is also a critical requirement for Russia, as ensuring the security of the Sevastopol and Tarsus bases is essential to maintaining its power projection capabilities in the Middle East and Mediterranean.

In sum, Russia’s global strategy focuses on aggressively countering threats against Russia’s political proxies in Ukraine and Syria.

Author: Masoumeh Mohammadi, expert on Eurasian issues

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