Armenia and Russia’s red lines experiment

According to the international group Tasnim news agency, Armenia is another important step in has reduced its cooperation with Russia. After the practical suspension of its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Yerevan sent an official letter to Moscow and demanded the cessation of the activities of the Russian border guards at Yerevan’s Zvartnots airport.

Nikol Pashinyan, Prime Minister of Armenia Increasingly targeted for interviews by Kremlin officials, his country now faces a dilemma; Its former ally in Moscow is untrustworthy and the West seems unwilling to offer anything but moral support. Armenia must now fend for itself in a troubled region.

Red Lines Test

Last winter, there were rumors about a possible visit of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to Armenia. Although never officially confirmed and ultimately not realized, Yerevan’s reluctance to deny the possibility appeared to be a deliberate provocation to the Russians. The deputy of the ruling party of the Civil Contract of Armenia was asked about Moscow’s possible reaction, he did not ease the tension and stated: “We are not worried about Russia’s response.” It’s their job…”

Ultimately, Zelensky did not make it to Armenia, but Yerevan’s explanation for why was not very conciliatory either. In this report, Zelensky originally planned to visit Yerevan and Baku, but when Azerbaijan canceled the visit to show goodwill to Moscow, Zelensky’s trip to the Caucasus was completely off the agenda.

Such ambiguity is partly related to the nature of Armenia’s evolving political approach. Recently, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan gave an interview to France 24 in which he seems to have announced the suspension of Yerevan’s participation in the CSTO, or at least talked about Armenia’s current status within the CSTO.

A few days later, Pashinyan stated in a speech in the Armenian Parliament: We have practically suspended our participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and if this process continues, we will officially separate from this treaty.

In his interview, Pashinyan brought up the issue of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and related it to other grievances against Moscow.

He referred to the case of Dmitry Strakov, a Russian citizen who was arrested in the Armenian city of Vanadzor by Russian military personnel and taken to Russia without the knowledge of the Armenian authorities. However, the incident occurred in December 2023, and at the time, the public response of the Pashinyan government was very subdued, suggesting that the recent statement may have been more of an emotional gesture than a real political stance.

Also, a similar situation has been expressed regarding the request of the Russian border guards to leave Yerevan’s Zvartnots airport. The people who have flown to Yerevan by air have never encountered Russian agents in border control uniforms. Meanwhile, there has been no mention of the Russian personnel who protect Armenia’s borders with Iran and Turkey, as well as the Russian guards who protect the 102nd Russian military base in Gyumri.

Some may be argue that Yerevan is clearly provoking Moscow, while others argue that Pashinyan is just testing Russia’s red lines.

Illusion of Unity

Armenia has long been considered a satellite country in Moscow. In private conversations inside Armenia, it is often acknowledged that Moscow would never risk its special relationship with Baku to defend Yerevan in a conflict between the two. Neither on the basis of the collective security agreement nor on the basis of the 1997 bilateral friendship treaty between Armenia and Russia, while many in Yerevan cited these documents as proof of Moscow’s fraternal commitments, which, of course, seems to be baseless.

First, there is no equivalent to NATO Article 5 in these treaties. Second, in 1997, Russia signed a similar treaty with Azerbaijan, which confirmed mutual assistance with similar powers. It should be noted that Article 5 of this document clearly states: “The parties undertake to condemn separatism in all its forms and undertake not to support separatist movements”.

, even from an official point of view, the idea of ​​an exclusive alliance between Armenia and Russia is highly exaggerated.

But over time, this myth formed the basis of Armenia’s foreign policy, Yerevan could not Cross certain “red lines” in security issues. The Karabakh issue seemed to be frozen for an indefinite period of time, and this hypothesis of Moscow’s support had turned into a natural law for Yerevan. Russia supplied arms to Armenia (as informed sources claim) on mutually beneficial terms, but this form of support was completely ineffective in its first real test, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.

The so-called “Yervan Electricity” protest in the summer of 2015 added an allegorical layer to this narrative. Thousands of Armenians, mostly young people, came to the streets of Yerevan to protest against the sharp increase in electricity prices. It was Russia, Serzh Sargsyan, the president of Armenia at the time, put the responsibility of the price increase on the Russian company “Inter Rao”. But this company did not respond to Armenian protests in any way, on the other hand, it was almost impossible for Armenians to challenge Russia’s interests in Armenia only one year after the Ukrainian Maidan Revolution in 2013-2014.

In Yerevan, current Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has long understood the true cost of Armenia’s reliance on Russia.

However, the popular revolution or color coup that Pashinyan came to power in 2018 largely eschewing any liberal, pro-Western, or anti-Russian aspirations. Perhaps, amid today’s widespread dissatisfaction of the Armenian people with Russia, the Prime Minister finally got an opportunity to antagonize Moscow. However, Nikol is always careful about the narrow borders to avoid creating instability between Moscow and Yerevan. //newsmedia.tasnimnews.com/Tasnim/Uploaded/Image/1402/12/27/14021227093545691296324810.jpg”/>

Moscow’s options are limited when considering a response to Yerevan. Prolonged problems at the Lars-Alia border crossing in Georgia, Armenia’s main route to Russia, have become somewhat normal.

Although these problems are painful, they are not necessarily catastrophic, especially given that Moscow cannot use them to its advantage. The same applies to regulations enforced by Russia’s Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision, which in November 2023 began blocking imports of various Armenian agricultural products for “safety” reasons, largely tinged with geopolitical motivation. .

But the intensification and transfer of restrictive measures to outright bans on the part of Armenia indicates something beyond the re-evaluation of relations. This effectively indicates a desire on the part of Yerevan to cut ties with Russia, something it did not even decide to do with Georgia during periods of heightened hostilities that included five days of open warfare in August 2008.

Economic relations between the two countries, in general, have their own momentum, especially in the current situation. Armenia’s exports to Russia will increase by almost 40% in 2023. It is no secret that the term “export diversification” often hides ordinary re-exports (exports that go through Armenia to Russia because of sanctions) and serves as a means of circumventing sanctions. However, today no one in Moscow is willing to take such a risk to disrupt trade with Armenia.

On the other hand, there is still a risk of conflict with Azerbaijan; Among them, Baku’s desire to reach Zangzor Corridor. Perhaps, based on some analysis, it can be said that this corridor is more important for Moscow, and Baku may use Moscow’s capacity to launch this corridor instead of entering into tension again.

However, the assumption of complete impunity would be too safe a move for Yerevan. Moscow may not respond hastily, but it will surely respond fully.

Some actions by the Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision, some changes in the price of export gas and maybe help to Baku In the escalation of local tensions with Armenia. In short, Moscow still has the ability to make life more difficult for Armenian officials who already resent Moscow, even if that feeling is not always justified.

It seems It turns out that both Moscow and Yerevan use the assumption that the system of pressure tactics is a delicate and complex issue that needs careful consideration at every stage.

The West has nothing to offer

Exiting the Collective Security Treaty and reducing reliance on Moscow is not the beginning of a journey, but the end It is the culmination of a series of actions that go far beyond mere foreign policy issues. Finally, Armenia, like Georgia, where the process of Westernization accelerated after Saakashvili took office and finally led to the granting of a candidacy for membership in the European Union, has put a move similar to Georgia on its agenda in Yerevan.

However, as Armenia’s “Velvet Revolution” began in 2018 with different, non-reformist slogans, distancing itself from Russia seems necessary today. But for further development and rapprochement in moving towards Europe, this hardly seems to be enough. Attempting to channel discontent with Russia over the handover of Karabakh into a real wave of attitude change requires reforms in established Armenian traditions and ways of life.

Furthermore, for the West, it is The present of Armenia is, to be frank, a side issue. Even for Georgia, which has advantages such as access to the Black Sea and transit opportunities that are mainly tied to East Asia or Azerbaijan as one of the energy sources, attracting the attention of Europe seems almost a very difficult task. Armenia will remain a local pillar for the West in the Caucasus, and its importance will change with the erosion of concepts such as “the post-Soviet space” and “South Caucasus”.

Helping Yerevan to free itself from Russia’s orbit, efforts such as the resolution of the European Parliament or the deployment of military observers of the European Union, are more than a gesture of moral support for the current Pashinyan government in the diplomatic struggle with Russia and overcoming domestic political challenges. It is not.

Although the idea of ​​a Russian security guarantee for Armenia may be a myth, it at least has some theoretical validity, something that will not be offered to Yerevan by France, India or even NATO. .

Furthermore, given the current global conditions and resource constraints, these alternatives are not very attractive. While a fundamental overhaul of Armenia’s security framework is indeed necessary, Paris’s support for this effort may not be immediately feasible given the complexities involved.

Certainly the most important and effective security strategy For Armenia, it lies in regional stability, provided that it is able to resolve conflicts with the right selection of regional partners such as Iran, which is considered one of the important powers of the region, and because of its border with Armenia, it has the ability to cooperate in time in the challenges facing this country. Armenian-Azerbaijani and Armenian-Turkish assistance.

This requires moving away from historical rivalries and strategic alliances, a change that neither Armenia nor its allies can achieve alone. However, it should be acknowledged that no foreign force has the capacity to prevent the pursuit of political and cultural developments in Armenia. Author: Mahdi Seif Tabrizi, a researcher Russia and the Caucasus

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