America’s options against Saudi nuclear ambitions

According to the international group Tasnim news agency, citing Middle East News, last year 2023), less than a month before the Al-Aqsa Storm operation on October 7, everything changed, Israel and Saudi Arabia were negotiating to normalize relations. After decades of cold relations, the price Israel had to pay for peace with Saudi Arabia was certainly high: in addition to US security guarantees and Israel’s minimal symbolic concessions on Palestinian sovereignty, Saudi negotiators demanded access to civilian nuclear technology.

With the continuation of the Israeli war and the Palestinian resistance, while the Arab public opinion, including the Saudis themselves, is outraged by the killing of the Palestinian people by the Zionist regime, even if the Saudi authorities are interested in talking to the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. , it will likely be impossible to negotiate a lasting peace.

As the United States considers how to promote stability in the Middle East, both during and after the Gaza war, the issue of Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program is an issue. is important If Washington hopes to normalize Saudi Arabia’s relations with Israel, it will have to give in to Riyadh’s demands for civilian nuclear cooperation — a development that could dramatically change the regional security picture.

Although Saudi Arabia still has infrastructure It does not have significant nuclear power, but it is building a small nuclear research reactor on the outskirts of Riyadh and building ballistic missiles with China’s help. Considering the threats it feels in the region, it may be tempted to move towards military nuclear programs in the future. The United States should try to reduce this risk, which is a difficult policy for Washington: because if Washington does not cooperate much with the Saudis, it may lose Saudi support for normalizing relations with Israel, and the United States will cede its influence to rivals such as China. .

But if America supports Saudi Arabia’s nuclear enrichment program unconditionally, then Riyadh can use this opportunity to develop a nuclear weapons program; Therefore, it seems, Washington should accept the peaceful nuclear ambitions of Saudi Arabia, but insist on strong measures and strict regulations to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by the Saudis and prevent a regional arms race.

Past examples such as North Korea and Libya have shown that countries’ civilian nuclear programs can be a way to develop nuclear weapons, and this also applies to Saudi Arabia. Possessing dual-use technologies in a civilian program, such as enrichment capabilities, could enable Saudi Arabia to advance its nuclear capabilities toward military applications through diversion and stealth. This latent nuclear capability can be used as a tool for bargaining or hostile behavior.

A number of factors; Among other things, the desire to strengthen national security, deter potential enemies, and increase geopolitical influence could lead Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, but the main motivation could probably be regional competition with its neighbors, including Iran; But for now, Iran appears to have decided not to take the next step and militarize its nuclear program.

Washington could play a decisive role in whether Saudi Arabia acquires nuclear weapons. No, it will, but one fundamental question remains: How far is the United States willing to protect Saudi Arabia? Will the United States give Riyadh firm security guarantees, such as a commitment to put Saudi Arabia under its nuclear umbrella? Is America willing to sign a formal security alliance with Saudi Arabia similar to the one it has in Europe or East Asia? Although there are ongoing talks about a formal defense relationship, a security agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia is far from final. Especially since there is a possibility that Donald Trump will win the presidential election.

Beyond a security alliance, the US can force Riyadh to sign the “123 Agreement” for nuclear cooperation. These agreements take their name from a section of the US Atomic Energy Act that provides access to US civilian nuclear technology in exchange for an explicit commitment by the other party to refrain from producing weapons. The United States has negotiated these agreements on a case-by-case basis with 47 countries, including Brazil, Japan and Turkey. These agreements typically require a country to adhere to IAEA safeguards, limit enrichment levels and return spent nuclear fuel to the United States to prevent reprocessing into weapons-grade material. The golden rule of the 123 agreement is a complete ban on enrichment. However, one obstacle to such an agreement is Riyadh’s desire to enrich uranium domestically to generate nuclear power, rather than relying on foreign-enriched uranium. If the United States is unable to negotiate a total enrichment ban and unwilling to make other concessions, Saudi Arabia may turn to other countries, such as China, for nuclear technology assistance, leading to a loss of transparency about its nuclear activities and facilities. And the US will lose influence.

So, to prevent Saudi Arabia from turning to China, the US may need to compromise. Washington could offer to build uranium enrichment facilities in Saudi Arabia, which would allow Riyadh to have more control over its nuclear fuel supply chain and reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers. The United States can still insist on strong measures to prevent the development of Saudi Arabia’s military program. For example, it could require that any enrichment facility be operated by American experts or install a remote shutdown mechanism. But Washington should have a clear perspective on such provisions: these measures will certainly reduce the risk of Saudi Arabia’s nuclear proliferation, but not eliminate them. Work to develop a nuclear weapons program. Washington cannot afford the delay.

As an alternative to Saudi enrichment, Washington could guarantee a reliable supply of enriched uranium to Saudi reactors, eliminating the country’s need for domestic enrichment facilities. possibilities; They range from a long-term suspension of domestic Saudi enrichment to the operation of enrichment facilities under the supervision of US experts instead of Saudi personnel, as well as remote shutdown mechanisms in the event of a potential takeover.

Washington could impose an enrichment ban as part of cooperation. Bilateral defense bet. This could take the form of a formal ban signed by Riyadh, or a non-binding supplementary document with a formal agreement containing an additional clause in which Saudi Arabia agrees not to build fuel cycle infrastructure.

This approach would allow Riyadh to retain the technical right to enrich, but agree in advance not to use it. Considering the threats in the region, strengthening the security agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia will continue to be a top priority for Saudi Arabia and a factor in limiting its nuclear ambitions. Emphasize Chinese and Russian technology and emphasize technical advantages and adherence to US standards for nuclear programs and enhance transparency. They should also urge Saudi Arabia to commit to maintaining a rules-based international order characterized by norms and cooperation. If Washington fails to make a convincing offer to Riyadh, it risks losing any leverage over Saudi Arabia’s nuclear capabilities.

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