Grossi’s request to Iran to conduct high-level negotiations

according to the report of Tasnim news international group, Rafael Grossi Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in a part of his statement at the beginning of the quarterly meeting of the Board of Governors regarding Iran’s nuclear program, said: Regarding the issue of Iran’s nuclear program, my latest report on verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of Council Resolution 2231 You have the security of the United Nations (2015).

He further claimed: Iran’s enriched uranium reserves, including uranium reserves enriched up to 60%, are currently is an increase The Agency has lost knowledge regarding the production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and tails, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate. More than three years have passed since the temporary suspension of the implementation of the Additional Protocol by Iran.

Grossi also claimed without referring to Iran’s cooperation and explanations regarding the two remaining sites claimed by the Agency: You also have my report on the NPT safeguards agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran. There has been no progress in resolving the remaining safeguards issues. Iran has not provided the IAEA with a valid technical explanation for the presence of man-made uranium particles in Varamin and Torquzabad, or informed the IAEA of the current locations of nuclear material or contaminated equipment.

However, the agency has not provided valid documents in this regard so far and only based on information. The Zionist regime has made its own investigations in this regard. In response to this claim, Iran has clearly stated that there is no place that should be declared under the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement (CSA); including through explanatory notes INFCIRC/1159 dated November 23, 2023, INFCIRC/1131 dated September 14, 2023, INFCIRC/996 dated June 7, 2022 and INFCIRC/967 dated December 3, 2021, which were sent by Iran.

Iran has presented its technical explanations regarding these claims in various reports to the agency, but the political procedure in this international organization and being influenced by the Zionist regime so far has caused that even though no document There is no valid proof of Iran’s violation during these years, these alleged cases should not be closed by the agency. Iran claimed: Iran is not yet implementing the revised Code 3.1 because it has announced that it has suspended its implementation. These remaining safeguards issues stem from Iran’s obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and must be resolved so that the Agency is in a position to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.

Following the illegal withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and the inability of the European Union and three European countries, Germany, France, and England, to implement their obligations, Iran, based on clauses 26 and 36 of the JCPOA, has taken all voluntary clarifying measures beyond its comprehensive safeguards agreement, including the implementation of the amendment code. 3.1 (as specified in paragraph 65 of the annex to the JCPOA). It was fully in line with its inherent rights according to Articles 26 and 36 of the JCPOA and in response to the illegal withdrawal of the US from the JCPOA, and this obvious fact cannot be a basis for the Agency and other Western countries to demand beyond the NPT and also to refuse to fulfill their obligations.

Code 3.1 is an integral part of the subsidiary arrangements of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Grossi continued by referring to his trip to Tehran in May of this year and meeting with Iranian officials, stating that he shared with them several concrete proposals to strengthen the implementation of the joint statement of March 4, 2023.

In the discussion of canceling the appointment of inspectors of the agency, Grossi should deal with the essence of the matter instead of projecting it. He claims that Iran fired inspectors based on their nationality and should not have canceled their appointment. This is despite the fact that according to Iran’s law, it has the right to cancel the appointment of inspectors not only before appointing them, but also after that.

The member has the right to avoid accepting one or a group of inspectors who are found to be incompetent, or to leave their mission incomplete or incomplete, and the exercise of this right does not require the achievement or existence of any special conditions, and the country is completely independent.

According to paragraph one of Article 9 of the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement, the Agency must receive Iran’s consent for its proposed inspectors. Also, according to the second paragraph of the same article, if Iran opposes it either at the time of the proposal of the inspector or at any other time after the selection of an inspector, the agency must propose another inspector or inspectors to the government of Iran. According to paragraph three of the aforementioned article, if due to the repeated refusal of the Iranian government to accept the inspectors proposed by the agency, the implementation of the inspection is interrupted according to the agreement, this objection must be referred to the board of governors by the director general of the agency. According to the explicit text of the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement, Iran can avoid accepting inspectors or inspectors without any explanation and at any time when it deems an inspector or inspectors incompetent, and the agency must replace another inspector or inspectors.

At the end of his statement, he reiterated his request to the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to continue high-level talks and technical exchanges following the results of his trip to Tehran.

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