Al-Aqsa Flood: A historic operation protecting the region and the world from grave danger

Question: What are the specific goals and interests of the US in this conspiracy? What measures has it taken to further this agenda?

F. Izadi: In the name of God, the most gracious, the most merciful:

The Biden administration’s main concern, which continues to persist, is that despite nearing the end of his term and having been the US president for three years, Biden has yet to achieve a significant foreign policy milestone.

Unlike the Obama administration, which, despite its limited success in foreign policy, at least secured the JCPOA or Iran nuclear deal, and unlike the Trump administration, which facilitated the Abraham Accords—leading to the normalization of relations between some Arab countries like the UAE and Bahrain with the Zionist regime—the Biden administration has failed to make significant achievements not only in the West Asia region but globally.

They initiated a project in Ukraine, which faltered due to Russia’s tactfulness, and have not made much progress there. Their issues have not been resolved in other areas either; their problems with China have escalated, and the issue of Taiwan has not yielded benefits for the United States. Economically, whether in China, Africa, South America, or elsewhere, the US administration has been unable to advance its anti-Chinese policies, while China, Russia, and Iran have managed to resist these pressures.

In the West Asia region, the Biden administration has shown no capability. Given these points, Biden felt the need to secure some successes in the West Asia region as his term gradually ends, not in the form of the Abraham Accords, which was Trump’s project and did not advance much post-Trump, but through an agreement with Saudi Arabia—an agreement the Biden administration aimed to broker between Saudi Arabia and Zionist regime.

The administration believed that if an agreement was struck between Saudi Arabia and the Zionist regime, then a number of other Arab and Islamic countries in the region would follow Saudi Arabia’s lead in normalizing their relations, thereby definitively resolving the Palestinian issue seventy years after the establishment of Zionist regime and achieving normalization with all Arab countries.

Following this, all these countries, under Zionist regime’s leadership, would focus their efforts on confronting and pressuring Iran. Zionist regime would assume a leadership and strategic role in the region, and with Arab financial backing and Zionist regime planning, West Asia would transform into a region led predominantly by the US, with Zionist regime as its agent.

Ultimately, the US would alleviate its concerns about the West Asia region, allowing it to concentrate on its confrontations with China and Russia, steering those situations towards its desired outcomes. Thus, this strategy was the objective of the US administration, fully endorsed by the Zionist regime and agreed upon by Saudi Arabia.

Question: Please explain the dimensions of this US-Zionist regime conspiracy/project.

F. Izadi: As mentioned previously, Saudi Arabia was generally supportive of this initiative but had specific concerns and requests.

Their first request to the U.S. was for a written security agreement. Ideally, Saudi Arabia would like to join NATO, as Article 5 of the NATO treaty guarantees that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all, necessitating collective defense.

For this reason, the Saudi government sought a [written] guarantee from the US, driven by past experiences where the US response was perceived as inadequate. Notably, following the attack on the Aramco refinery in Saudi Arabia, the US government’s lack of specific action prompted concern. The Saudis have encountered other challenges that reinforced their desire for a more concrete commitment from the Americans.

Secondly, Saudi Arabia expressed interest in developing a nuclear program, including [uranium] enrichment within its borders.

Third, the Saudis requested access to advanced weaponry that typically the U.S. reserves for itself and Zionist regime.

The fourth concern centers on the future of Mohammed bin Salman, whose father is elderly and unwell. Initially, the U.S. preferred Mohammed bin Salman’s cousin, Muhammad bin Nayef, for the Saudi throne. However, bin Nayef was eventually sidelined for undisclosed reasons, prompting Salman to favor his own children over his brothers for succession.

Consequently, Mohammed bin Salman hopes that the Americans will not obstruct his ascension to the throne, conspire against him, or challenge his legitimacy following his father’s death.

The Saudis expressed these four major concerns.

The American relationship with Muhammad bin Nayef dates back to the 1970s when he was a student at the University of Portland in the US, and continued after he moved to the UK, where both the CIA and MI6 developed relationships with him. Upon returning to Saudi Arabia, he served as deputy minister of defense under his father.

He had collaborated with the Americans across various fields for many years, and Muhammad bin Nayef was the preferred choice of the U.S. for the next king of Saudi Arabia—a plan that ultimately did not materialize. Consequently, Mohammed bin Salman harbored concerns that the Americans might revert to supporting Muhammad bin Nayef.

Mohammed bin Salman’s fears were compounded by his involvement in the Khashoggi killing and the subsequent opposition he faced in the US Congress and beyond. In response to his concerns, the Americans explained that while Saudi Arabia’s geographical location in West Asia, often referred to as the Middle East, precludes its membership in NATO, it could still benefit from a partnership with the United States as part of a group known as major non-NATO allies. This designation is reserved for countries that cannot be NATO members but can still engage in substantial security agreements with the US.

The Americans addressed the first request by stating that while Saudi Arabia cannot become a NATO member, it could join an alternative group designated for major non-NATO allies.

Regarding the second request concerning enrichment within Saudi Arabia, this posed a challenge as well, due to provisions in the 2023 US budget law. This legislation mandates that the US must not cooperate with any country that seeks to conduct enrichment on its own soil.

That is, there are 123 Agreements that the Americans should sign with countries that want to have nuclear interactions with the United States, under which enrichment is prohibited.

In the third case, the weapons that the Saudis wanted were not accessible. The fourth case was not necessarily an easy task either. The Americans explained to Saudi Arabia that all four requests require the approval of Congress, and the only way to secure this approval is for Saudi Arabia to normalize its relations with Zionist regime.

If a country wants to become a major non-NATO ally, it needs the approval of Congress. In the second case, if a country wants to be an exception, contrary to the 123 Agreements which prohibit enrichment, it must pledge not to conduct enrichment within its borders. If Saudi Arabia seeks such an exception, it also requires Congressional approval.

For the more advanced, specialized weapons Saudi Arabia sought, the US administration’s ability to provide them also hinges on Congressional approval.

The fourth case is also complicated by uncertainties surrounding when King Salman may pass and whether the Biden administration will still be in office. Nonetheless, the US administration has clearly stated that the first three requests require Congressional approval, and Saudi Arabia faces opposition within both the Republican and Democratic parties in Congress. They generally view Mohammed bin Salman as unfit for kingship due to his various problems and weaknesses. Therefore, there is considerable hesitancy towards Mohammed bin Salman and these Saudi requests.

Nevertheless, the Biden administration is willing to advance this plan. They stated their intention to coordinate with the senators, noting that the senators’ support and the price of approval for the three or four issues concerning Saudi Arabia hinge on Saudi Arabia normalizing relations with Zionist regime.

This approach is justified by the well-known extensive influence and lobbying power of Zionist regime in the US Congress. The normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Zionist regime is highly favored by the Zionist regimes, and should this normalization occur, the Zionist regimes would likely use their lobbying power to sway the senators in favor of Saudi Arabia’s desires. This was the message conveyed by the Biden administration to Saudi Arabia.

Before the Al-Aqsa Flood, these four requests from Saudi Arabia had almost yielded positive results due to the favorable response from the United States and ongoing coordination with the US Congress.

Also, even though these were the four main concerns of Saudi Arabia, the Saudis were also concerned that if they sought to normalize their relations with Zionist regime, something should be said about Palestine and the Palestinian cause and support for Palestine. Their negotiation was about these four things that I mentioned and another point that Saudi Arabia was emphasizing: the agreement between Saudi Arabia and Zionist regime must be presented in a way that does not suggest Saudi Arabia is completely indifferent to the cause of Palestine.

However, the statements they were making were extremely weak and full of ifs and buts. They did not demand, for instance, that Saudi Arabia request the establishment of a Palestinian state, the implementation of the two-state solution, the definition of the borders of the Palestinian state, or the recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people. They were not assertive because they knew that Zionist regime would not agree to such strong statements. Therefore, their statements were limited to suggestions like, “Zionist regime should try to take steps towards the establishment of a Palestinian state.” These were weak statements that the Zionist regimes could easily disregard after a while.

The Zionist regimes also wanted to receive some money from Saudi Arabia, which Saudi Arabia intended to give under the guise of bolstering the Palestinian economy. Earlier promises had suggested that, following the Abraham Accords, the UAE and other countries that recognized Zionist regime would make significant investments. However, these investments did not materialize, and there was little progress in those areas. Nevertheless, to save face, Saudi Arabia expressed verbal concerns for Palestine, albeit in a limited manner, as I described. The path to normalization was becoming completely paved.

This was mentioned in the Leader’s speech on June 3, 2024. The negotiations had almost reached an agreement. There were numerous trips back and forth between Washington, Riyadh, and Al-Quds. Reports surfaced of Zionist regime officials making secret visits to Saudi Arabia, and in some cases, these visits were made public, such as an Zionist regime minister attending a conference in Saudi Arabia. It was even reported that Netanyahu had traveled to Riyadh once or twice, and discussions of this nature were taking place. The process was nearly complete until Operation Al-Aqsa Flood occurred.

Question: What was the role of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood in thwarting and disrupting this large-scale imperialist project?

F. Izadi: When Operation Al-Aqsa Flood began, it was a huge shock for the Zionist regime. They did not expect to receive such a blow. They did not anticipate being struck in this manner. And while they were still shocked, from the very first days, they started this process of genocide and the massacre of the Palestinian people. Ultimately, while the Zionist regime was engaged in genocide, bombings, and so on, the entire project of normalizing relations between Zionist regime and Saudi Arabia was brought to a halt and has stopped up until today.

In recent months, Jake Sullivan, Biden’s national security advisor, and a number of other US officials, like Blinken, have made multiple trips to Saudi Arabia. This issue has not been dismissed; it is being pursued. One of the tools they have to encourage Zionist regime to accept the ceasefire is that if it accepts the ceasefire, it will be possible for it to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia, and then the project that has been halted for seven to eight months could resume. Therefore, this is one of the things that should assist in [persuading] the Zionist regime to put an end to these crimes.

However, the crux of the problem for the Zionist regime is that if the war were to cease, Netanyahu will sense that his time in office as prime minister is over. He has a personal concern, and ultimately, the Zionists were not successful in defeating Hamas. So, just as the Leader [of the Islamic Revolution] stated, they have not achieved any of their declared objectives.

In other words, eight months have now passed since Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, and Hamas’s capabilities are still more or less intact. The areas in Gaza which were supposed to be cleared of Hamas’s presence still contain Hamas forces. They are present both above and below the ground. This is what the Western media have reported.

Therefore, stopping the war now would equate to Zionist regime’s defeat. And not just Netanyahu’s defeat, but Zionist regime’s defeat. This would make it difficult for Netanyahu’s government, or any other government that comes to power, to return to the pre-Al-Aqsa Flood state. One of the reasons why the normalization of relations was discussed was so that the regions of West Asia would be managed under the umbrella of a large and powerful state like Zionist regime, which is very powerful in terms of its military, intelligence, and economy.

This was the scenario in the beginning: the normalization of relations would take place with Saudi Arabia, and then Zionist regime’s dominance and presence in the entire West Asia region would be realized, with the exception of Iran, which is an independent country. And then [the plan was to] exert pressure on Iran and potentially overthrow the Islamic Republic. That was what they had imagined.

But now, in light of the severe blow that Zionist regime has received, all the indicators that I mentioned are being called into question. The Zionist regime army has been called into question, the Zionist regime intelligence system has been called into question, its economic capability has been called into question, and basically, Zionist regime has lost its position. As the Leader pointed out, Zionist regime is melting before the eyes of the people and governments of the region and worldwide.

Therefore, that plan has been damaged because there are doubts and speculations about whether or not Zionist regime will ever be able to stand on its own feet again. The normalization talks are not off the table due to the kind of pressure that the US government can exert on Saudi Arabia. Of course, it has become difficult. It has become extremely difficult. But it is not off the table. However, the ultimate goal of Zionist regime managing the region will no longer be achieved. Why? Because the country that is supposed to manage the region cannot even manage itself, and it is in the process of withering and melting away.

Therefore, Operation Al-Aqsa Flood holds immense significance because it has altered the future of the region and the world. The analyses presented by the Leader align with the growing consensus among experts in the region. The importance of Al-Aqsa Flood is being recognized by experts in this field, regardless of whether they are Western or Eastern. And this is an important point.

Furthermore, in addition to Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, Operation True Promise and the direct targeting of Zionist regime by the Islamic Republic, through the use of ballistic missiles and other missiles, was also another blow, in addition to the blows of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, and it had the same effects.

So, Zionist regime’s position has come into question. Its capabilities have been questioned, while the magnitude of Iran’s capabilities has become clear. The decision of Iranian officials regarding the use of these capabilities has been made clear, and it is now impossible to return to previous conditions, since Zionist regime is not the same as before, and it never will be. This fact has been acknowledged by all. The question now is not how Zionist regime will manage the West Asia region, but rather whether Zionist regime will even exist in the future. This is why the Al-Aqsa Flood, as the Leader mentioned, holds immense significance.

Question: If the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation had not been carried out and the American-Zionist regime conspiracy had been successful, what dangers would threaten the present and future situation of Palestine, West Asia, and Islamic countries?

F. Izadi: If Operation Al-Aqsa Flood had not been carried out and the American-Zionist regime conspiracy had been successful, relations between Zionist regime and Saudi Arabia would have been normalized. Following this normalization, other countries hesitant towards Saudi Arabia or under its influence would have followed suit. Zionist regime’s dominance in the region, as well as America’s, would have expanded. Palestine’s case would have been closed, ultimately allowing the Americans to achieve their goals in the region.

The only problem they would have faced would be the existence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which they would have used all their capabilities to attack. These would be the consequences of not carrying out the Al-Aqsa Flood operation. In this sense, the operation was historic and truly changed the future of the region and the world. It showed that the Resistance policy of the Islamic Republic, the policy of supporting the Islamic Republic’s friends in Palestine, was correct.

During the past 45 years, there have been some relatively high-ranking individuals in the country who had doubts and concerns about these policies. If it weren’t for Iran’s support, if it weren’t for the policies of supporting the Resistance, then the Resistance could not have carried out these operations at such a level. And if it had not been carried out, the same problems I mentioned earlier would have occurred, and this would have greatly added to Iran’s problems.

That is why supporting the goals of Palestine is beneficial for both Palestinians and Iranians, creating a real win-win situation. The Palestinian side benefits because the Palestinian cause is being supported, allowing Palestine to resist. Meanwhile, the Iranian side also gains an advantage because the issues between Iran and the US, as well as between Iran and the Zionist regime, are not solvable.

The goal of these two regimes is to overthrow the Islamic Republic in this region, while the Islamic Republic, with the help of its friends in the Axis of Resistance, is pushing back against the Zionist regime and American side. This is a joint action that is in the interest of the people of this region, and it holds great importance. This is why I believe Operation Al-Aqsa Flood proved the validity of our policy to support the Resistance.

So, if Iran had not supported the Resistance, then it would have experienced very difficult pressures. This was not achieved thanks to Operation Al-Aqsa Flood. Supporting the goals of Palestine or supporting the Resistance certainly has costs for the country, but not supporting it will result in much higher costs. The right thing to do is to support the Resistance and the oppressed people of Palestine.

So, from both an Islamic perspective, a rational perspective, and through pure geopolitical calculations, it is evident that supporting the Resistance is in Iran’s best interest. The good news is that those who have had doubts and criticized this policy in previous years will inevitably realize the fallacy of their words and the rightness of the country’s policy, which is supporting the goals of Palestine and the Resistance.

(The views expressed in this interview are interviewee’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of Khamenei.ir.)