“Al-Aqsa Storm”; A response to the difference in the balance of power between Hamas and Israel
Reporting Mehr News Agency, since October 7, 2023, especially due to the difference in the balance of power between the Zionist regime and Hamas, many questions have been raised about the justification of the Al-Aqsa storm operation, the level of rationality and its political impact. .
These questions after a year of war, the continuation and expansion of the crimes of the occupiers against the people of Gaza, the increase of conflicts on the Lebanese front and the escalation of the aggression of the Zionist regime in the West Bank , and the efforts of Zionist extremists to advance the policies of displacing Palestinians and developing their territory have been raised more than before.
about;
The fateful choices of the people and Hamas
The Hamas movement was established with the aim of confronting the occupation of the Zionist regime, and in 1993, the Oslo Agreement” by which the occupation government’s right to exist in 78% of the Palestinian land was recognized.
This position of Hamas was followed by widespread public support and thousands of Palestinians joined its ranks and pledged to continue the armed struggle until the occupiers leave.
This movement based its strategy on resistance and opposition to the situation caused by the Oslo Agreement until 2005 continued. However, due to the division of the people between the two options of resistance and compromise, the enthusiasm of Al-Aqsa Intifada decreased and in order to “maintain the resistance”, he decided to participate in the parliamentary elections of the Palestinian Authority. However, this decision was against the principles of struggle.
In the end, this victory, which was opposed by the West, following the split among the Palestinians and the opposition of the establishment’s security apparatus in cooperation with the elected government, led to the events of 2007 and Hamas took control of Gaza, after which the blockade of Gaza by the Zionist regime intensified.
Power Accumulation Strategy
After the victory of Hamas in the 2006 elections, the Zionist regime imposed a wide political and economic blockade against Gaza and the West Bank and focused on Gaza.
In contrast, Hamas used the strategy of “accumulation of power” and used its position as the ruler of Gaza to strengthen the power of popular and military resistance.
Although Hamas was able to put pressure on the Zionist regime with this strategy, especially considering the position of the Zionist regime regarding the level of the siege of Gaza and the weak reaction of the Arabs and the international community. Due to the crimes of the occupiers, it has not been able to solve the basic problems. Also, with the expansion of regional policies towards the normalization of relations with the Zionist regime, without restoring the rights of the Palestinians, the situation has become more difficult.
Hamas options against the siege
Faced with the continuation of the siege, Hamas resorted to tactics such as return marches, which began on “Earth Day” 2018 and continued for a year and a half.
These marches left hundreds of martyrs and thousands of wounded, and although some achievements were achieved, these achievements did not last due to the complicity of America and the weakness of other international parties.
Reconciliation efforts, which have been strengthened since 2017 under the leadership of Yahya Al-Sinwar in Gaza, are also a result It did not, because Mahmoud Abbas demanded to accept the agreements signed with the Zionist regime as a condition of participation in the government or liberation organization, which in fact meant the historical condemnation of Hamas and transfer to Fatah’s experience in prolonging the low-cost occupation for the Zionist regime.
At the same time, Hamas and other Palestinian groups realized the diminishing effectiveness of the accumulation of power, as the high casualties in any military confrontation with the Zionist regime meant that the movement often withdrew from the confrontation. Avoid direct.
Different strategies against the invaders
In this situation, Hamas adopted a different strategy from other Palestinian groups. For example, the Islamic Jihad movement tried to maintain a level of continuous conflict with the Zionist regime, even if these conflicts were at a low level, in order to prevent the occupiers from becoming complacent and expanding their influence by using the “preoccupation strategy”. The difference in these approaches caused two battles of Islamic Jihad with the Zionist regime in August 2022 and May 2023. was.
This issue put Hamas in front of a difficult national question; How is it possible for a national liberation movement to accept that the Zionist encroachment on the land under its sovereignty, along with the assassination of one of the greatest military commanders of another resistance movement, without Hamas directly engaging in such a battle?
At the same time, what the occupiers and their supporters were looking for in the Gaza Strip was a form of “economic peace”. In such a way that the blockade on the Gaza Strip is reduced, but this region ignores any national role related to other Palestinian regions. This included cooperating with the occupation regime and providing cheap labor for agricultural, industrial and construction jobs in the occupied lands.
This process started in recent years, when the Zionist regime allowed tens of thousands of Gazans to work in its territory and the number of permits issued It could depend on the security level of the area. In this way, Hamas was faced with two ways that it had to choose one of them:
• or accepting coexistence with the occupying regime and strengthening it, through complying with their demands to maintain security and suppressing any action to confront the occupying forces, which this decision leads to It would lead to a change in the identity and political direction of Hamas, as well as the risk of internal conflicts among Palestinians.
• Or try to “upset the table” against the occupiers and deliver a heavy blow that will create a new political reality. Naturally, Hamas chose this option, although it involved great risks.
Issue power imbalance
But the next question is: How did Hamas decide to take such action when the balance of military power was in favor of the occupation? To answer this question, the intellectual basis of Hamas as a resistance movement needs to be considered from several aspects:
On the one hand, the theoretical principle of resistance against the invaders does not require equality of material forces, although some balance is needed. In this regard, Andre Boffer, a military theorist and former NATO Chief of Staff, in his book “Introduction to Military Strategy” points out that liberation wars magnify the factor of spiritual force and They rely on the long duration of the struggle to deal with the difference in the balance of material power, which is usually in favor of the occupiers.
On the other hand, the Shariah basis, which forms the intellectual basis of Hamas, does not need the balance of forces in “Jihad Defense” – which deals with foreign aggression And he encourages every Muslim to defend his home and property against aggression, even if it leads to his martyrdom.
This does not conflict with following principles and planning to win. Islam encourages achieving one of the “two good things” – victory or martyrdom – but the first priority is the victory that a Muslim seeks, and if it is lost, the second good thing is also a value and is not blameworthy from the point of view of Sharia. /p>
In this context, it is worth noting that any popular or armed revolution is an adventure whose success is not guaranteed and is subject to win or lose. However, freedom is usually achieved only through repeated attempts, eventually increasing the cost of occupation to such an extent that it is no longer possible.
From the third aspect, it seems that Hamas has come to the conclusion that the combination of forces can impose a new reality on the occupiers. The historical review of the “Al-Aqsa Storm” decision shows that the previous battle of this operation, namely the “Sword Al-Quds battle in 2021, witnessed a massive popular reaction in the Palestinian areas inside the borders. In 1948, it was the West Bank and the borders of Jordan and Lebanon with Palestine, which forced the occupiers to stop the war after eleven days and accept some concessions of the Palestinians regarding Al-Aqsa Mosque and prevent the process of Judaizing this place.
In fact, in the occupied territories of 1948, where Palestinians and Jews live, the situation was similar to the beginning of a civil war, and some Jews They temporarily moved from these areas and military forces and army supply convoys to the borders of Gaza were disrupted.
Militarily as well, signs of Hezbollah’s desire to escalate conflicts with the occupation regime have increased, as Hezbollah has treated Lebanon’s severe economic crisis as part of an economic war. He knew against himself.
As some media reported, this readiness was seen in the party’s unprecedented military gathering south of the Litani River, and like the operation “Majdo” In March 2023, more courage was observed in targeting the occupying residents of the north of the occupied territories.
These factors strengthened the possibility of an early conflict between Hezbollah and the Zionist regime and may create an imposed reality for the occupiers and force them to stop the war due to the creation of a A new balance and better political conditions for the Palestinian and Lebanese parties.
Mohammed Zeef, commander-in-chief of , also tried to increase the probability of this scenario with a public invitation to the resistance axis and the entire Islamic and Arab nation, and asked them to take advantage of the opportunity of the occupiers’ confusion in the morning of the 7th of October and with More power, which is considered an existential threat to them, attack them.
But the size of the Al-Aqsa storm operation surprised Hezbollah like others; The level of escalation that Hezbollah intended did not reach this level, and as a result, it limited itself to partial support for the Gaza front in order to avoid an all-out war against Lebanon and the country’s territorial integrity.
However, this approach did not work either; Because after the Gaza front – which the occupiers were able to focus on for nearly a year – the pressure on Hezbollah increased once again and the opportunity to realize political goals that would meet the demands of the extremist government of the occupying regime regarding Gaza decreased.
At the level of popular reactions, the occupiers, the Palestinian Authority and many Arab governments took advantage of the previous experiences of popular movements and created an atmosphere that limited popular influence. . They accurately applied what they had learned before and during this round, which was evident in the following cases:
• Preventive legal and security action
• Suppressing public anger by creating false optimism that turns people into spectators instead of activists. converts
• Weakening public awareness by flooding the media with false information and anti-resistance ideas
• fueling social divisions and creating fear between different groups of people
• Attracting people or some elites by offering economic incentives or bribes
These tactics were actually effective in reducing the level of popular reaction to the aggressions of the Zionist regime and solidarity with the Gaza Strip.
In general, Al-Aqsa storm operation was a violent outburst against the occupiers’ efforts to eliminate the Palestinian issue and the forced integration of the Gaza Strip into a symbiotic system in terms of security and economy with the Zionist regime. .
According to Al Jazeera, while this operation managed to change the direction of regional policies and put a heavy burden on the shoulders of the occupiers, due to the high level of complicity of the Westerners with the regime The occupation and the inability of the governments and people of the Arab and Islamic countries, especially the Palestinian neighbors, imposed a heavy cost on the people of the Gaza Strip.
But one cannot expect the end of any occupation without suffering great pain, and the usual response to this is usually to punish the people under occupation.
Although it is not possible to predict the exact time for the end of the occupiers’ ability to continue the occupation, the continuation of the resistance act is an inevitable way to bring the occupiers to this point.
