Power Balance Between Tel Aviv and Damascus: From Normalization to Fragmentation
According to the English section of webangah News Agency, citing Mehr news Agency and al-Mayadeen, from its inception, the founders of the Israeli regime believed that Israel’s establishment in the Middle East was inherently incompatible with regional conditions. They argued that Israel’s survival depended on fragmenting the region.Therefore, Tel aviv’s ruling apparatus has always regarded Jewish society’s security as reliant on weakening and dividing neighboring countries. Even peace treaties with some neighbors have been treated as temporary ceasefires to address other fronts of conflict and destruction-setting the stage for settling scores later with those same states. This pattern has repeatedly occurred in Lebanon, Egypt, and within Palestinian self-governance structures.
the Israeli regime pursues its goals using three core factors:
– Deep divisions within Arab societies
– The declining influence of regional powers
– Unconditional Western support
Tel Aviv Negotiates with Syria from a Position of Strength
Over the past two decades, internal conflicts and rifts within various regional countries have threatened their national security. Some Arab societies have been engulfed by civil wars and unprecedented sectarian divides that have eroded key security and political infrastructures of basic states in the region.
In this context, Syria’s new regime initiated largely unproductive relations with Israel.following this change in power last December, Tel Aviv saw no direct threat from Damascus-viewing Syria as effectively removed from the Axis of Resistance-and thus felt no need to offer concessions. As than, Syria ceased being a rival to Israel; it became more a field for score-settling and message-sending. Meanwhile, after 14 years of war-induced attrition, Syria’s military lost notable infrastructure while numerous soldiers were sidelined.
The Normalization Key Lies in Azerbaijan
The Abu Muhammad al-Julani-led regime has signaled major shifts in Syrian political discourse since Bashar al-Assad’s fall. It expressed readiness for an open policy normalizing relations with israel-a process previously embraced by Bahrain, UAE, Morocco, and Sudan.
During the first half of 2025, regional and European intermediaries worked to establish dialog channels between Damascus and Tel Aviv. Reports indicated that Syria’s new leadership was not only willing to sign a peace agreement but also ready to recognize Israeli sovereignty over occupied Golan heights-contingent upon economic guarantees such as easing or lifting Western sanctions. Steve Whitcaffe (Donald Trump’s Middle East envoy) along with Thomas Barrack (his representative in Syria) speculated that indirect talks concerning border issues might commence soon.
Al-Julani’s recent trip to Azerbaijan marked a pinnacle effort in these endeavors. Azerbaijan-a strategic ally of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan-offered gas supplies to syria despite already providing about 60 percent of gasoline consumed by territories under occupation by Israel. Azerbaijan stands as Israel’s most important Muslim-majority partner regionally; it consistently supported Tel Aviv even during its Gaza offensive.
Challenges Facing Normalization between Damascus and Tel Aviv
Beyond what is described as “Israel’s illusionary power” or right-wing dreams for regional domination lies several obstacles opposing Syrian rapprochement efforts:
First: Fragile Legitimacy Within Al-Julani’s Regime
The post-Assad government lacks sufficient political legitimacy or popular backing; it is primarily formed through coalitions among domestic Salafi factions alongside external actors-which means any moves towards normalization may trigger internal uprisings or deeply fracture governance foundations across Syria.
Second: Absence Of A Centralized State Authority
Syria today cannot be classified as a conventional central state but rather resembles an unstable entity marked by administrative weakness compounded by multiple centers wielding influence throughout its territory.This fragmentation complicates reconciliation efforts since al-Julani lacks broad internal consensus supporting normalization initiatives.
Third: Fear Of Public Backlash
Although official Arab rhetoric regarding Palestine has diminished somewhat,the majority across Arab populations still view Israel as their primary enemy-the occupier denying them their lands.Any formal rapprochement thus risks accusations ranging from betrayal to sparking widespread protests aimed at destabilizing existing regimes further.
