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Deadlock in Beirut: Why Hezbollah’s Disarmament Conflicts with Lebanon’s Developments

Contrary to ‍the media narrative about the disarmament of Lebanon’s resistance, Hezbollah appears to have ⁢chosen⁣ a strategy of “rebuilding” rather than ‍”restoring deterrence” in the short term.

The extensive efforts by the United states and Israel ⁣to disarm Hezbollah have reached a clear deadlock. This stalemate⁤ stems not only from the steadfast resistance of Lebanon’s fighters but ⁤also from ⁤Lebanese ‌institutions’ hesitation in implementing Resolution 1701 and pressure from Western political⁣ and financial ‌actors. The⁣ Trump⁣ management, in full coordination⁢ with Tel Aviv, has employed sanctions, military threats, and diplomatic pressure to ​force Lebanon ⁢into submission. Though, this approach‌ has so far only deepened Lebanon’s internal crisis and strengthened ⁢Hezbollah’s position while substantially raising the risk of ⁤renewed conflict.

Yet the cancellation ⁤of Lebanese Army Commander General Joseph Aoun’s planned‌ visit⁢ to Washington-coinciding with saudi Crown Prince Mohammed‌ bin Salman’s trip to the U.S.-highlights growing rifts between Beirut’s government and‍ Western actors regarding⁢ Hezbollah’s disarmament.It also ‌signals Lebanon edging toward a potential civil war. This report seeks ‍to⁣ explain why the ‌project of “disarming Hezbollah” faces such an impasse.

The Reasons Behind General​ Aoun’s Canceled Washington Visit

Informed sources ‌in Lebanon revealed hidden dimensions behind the canceled trip by General Joseph Aoun (note: preceded by former commander Rudolf Heikal)⁢ that extend⁣ beyond his recent⁤ statement‍ condemning Israeli violations of ‍Lebanese sovereignty. This issue reflects broader escalating tensions between ⁢Aoun and ⁣U.S.political-security circles in Beirut. Sources ‍attribute these strains primarily to cooling⁤ relations ​between Aoun and Morgan Ortagus,​ Washington’s new envoy in Beirut-exacerbated‍ by Ortagus’ behind-the-scenes provocations against him‍ among some Lebanese politicians.

Ortagus accused Aoun of failing ‍to meet‌ U.S.​ demands aimed at curbing Hezbollah’s influence ⁤within Lebanon. The dissatisfaction⁢ escalated after⁢ a recent cabinet session where⁤ General‍ Aoun delivered a detailed report describing repeated security and political​ affronts against the army while warning that Lebanese forces stationed south were under direct Israeli aggression pressure. He even raised‌ suspending all army operations south of Litani River due to Israeli obstruction as⁤ an option-a stance that reportedly alarmed American intermediaries ⁣when relayed through influential ⁢figures ⁢inside⁤ Beirut’s​ government.

Washington’s chief frustration with General Aoun does not stem merely from his latest statement but primarily from his‌ refusal to comply with⁣ direct‍ U.S.-Israeli requests-for example, conducting⁤ searches inside southern residents’ ⁣homes for weapons caches ‌linked to Hezbollah. ⁣He called this⁣ demand “dangerous, destabilizing internally,” ‌warning that meeting it “would only open further demands,” ⁣as Israel would continuously escalate its expectations‍ toward Lebanon.
Cancelling ⁣this visit‌ is thus regarded as a political ‌message: Washington ​anticipated more aggressive cooperation ⁣from army leadership against Hezbollah; rather, General Aoun insisted on preserving defined⁣ military ‍roles focused on internal stability ‍protection.

is ⁢a Second Phase of the ​Third ​Lebanon War Imminent?

the third element complicating ⁣this deadly⁢ deadlock is Israel’s threat to ‍escalate​ war conditions further⁤ still. Officials including defense Minister Yoav ​gallant repeatedly state they⁤ will launch extensive operations targeting Hezbollah leadership hubs, weapon stockpiles, and‌ resistance infrastructure ⁣across ⁢all of Lebanon⁢ if⁤ disarmament fails.
Facing shortages totaling around⁢ 12,000 ‌active ⁣soldiers for ground warfare campaigns, Israel prefers intense air ‍strikes⁣ combined ‍with targeted ‍assassinations over large-scale incursions.
Concurrently ‍AWS lobbying efforts ⁤push Washington for unequivocal support for any new military action.
However these ⁢threats have backfired ‍politically-they’ve bolstered national unity within Lebanon ⁢supporting resistance forces rather‌ than‌ weakening them.

The post-“third Lebanon War” dynamics shifted confrontation ‌away from direct military ⁢clashes toward economic attrition warfare undermining governance structures.


The U.S.-Israeli strategy now ‌targets ​entire state institutions alongside economic frameworks aiming indirectly at constraining Hezbollah.

Specifically designed financial sanctions press entities like credit associations while Israeli warnings target critical infrastructure such as Beirut ‌Airport:
Together these form dual pressures intending politically costly consequences nationwide shoudl authorities allow or resist restricting funding ⁣streams serving Hezbollah logistics.
This ⁤tactic‍ places Lebanese sovereignty itself at stake-not collateral damage but central⁢ battlefield terrain-and converts economic control into primary leverage‍ over regional ​influence contestations involved with Tehran-aligned groups.

Parallel Efforts⁤ Targeting Financial Channels linked To Hezbollah

This resolve ⁤translates into intensified intelligence actions against individuals connected⁣ financially or logistically domestically or abroad with group networks.
For example ‘Alma,’ an ⁣educational-research center associated‍ with ⁢Shin Bet reported‌ how‌ iranian Quds Force managed transferring $1 billion ⁢sence January 2025 towards⁢ post-war reconstruction funds mainly through currency exchange ⁣firms.

The latest tranche exposed ⁣by America Treasury Department sanctions targeted key Lebanese figures⁤ reportedly⁤ funneling tens ‍millions⁢ during 2025 ‌via illicit exploitation involving multiple exchange houses abusing cash-based financing systems permissible under local law.

On June⁤ 24th 2025 following an Israeli precise air strike​ was killed haitham Abdullah Bakri-manager⁣ responsible for ‘Al-Sadiq’ money​ exchange ⁣bureau ‍notably ⁢pivotal within financing corridors sustaining⁤ terror-related activities benefiting armed groups regionally destabilizing governments⁢ including Tehran-backed factions.

Other prominent licensed⁣ exchanges integral parts named ‘Mekataf,’ ‘Yara,’ ‘Al-Insaf,’ ‘Maliha,’⁤ ‘Hassan Ayash’ complete networks channel ​diverse resources flowing including Iranian aid proceeds global fundraising ⁢plus transnational criminal ⁣revenue streams facilitating‍ armaments traffics disguised amidst⁢ legal ‍commercial activity unchecked ⁣fully yet ‌covered through‍ enforceable ⁤oversight lapses indigenous regulatory⁤ bodies.

A ‍recent American think tank ‘Foundation For Defense Of Democracies’ accuses Hizballah partly financing operations through organized crime fronts ⁤documented extending decades linked historically ‌since Syria controlled drug cultivation trades ⁣during wartime amid‌ dire breakdowns⁤ pervasive economic‍ sectors⁣ within Bekaa ‍Valley since1970s-80s⁣ era​ evolving gradually group objectives beyond mere profit motives; their handling abundant ⁢narcotics via existing smuggling ‌networks ‌bordering Israel⁢ promotes operational gains balancing tradeoffs involving drugs-for-intelligence deals negotiating Arab-Israeli criminals alongside arms shipments covertly utilizing same conduits assignments confirmed relevant detentions including kidnappings like Eldan Tannenbaum ‍plus espionage endeavors ⁢e.g., Col⁤ omar Hayeb⁤ illustrating blurred‍ distinctions between illicit ventures versus covert security-military functions given essential strategic⁤ instrumentality⁤ meaning⁢ exploitation narcotics traffics‍ serves well-established tactical agendas underpinning militant ‍drafts higher ⁤value weight intrinsically integral facilitation ‌accessories fortifying enclave resilience inside contested border⁢ zones .

Conclusion

Away from prevailing media narratives celebrating prospects envisioned surrounding armed forces’ dismantlement initiatives aimed at resistance⁢ camps insideLebanon,
Hezbollah under Sheikh Naim Qassem apparently opts presently mainly rebuilding core​ combat units rather than renewing short-term‌ deterrence ​capabilities aiming consequently enabling long-term capabilities able resisting ‍Zionist enemy moves effectively rebuilding readiness ⁣reminiscent expelling occupation troops back year circa 2000 requiring structural enhancement addressing weak points exposed during⁤ last conflicts altering power balance⁢ shaping East-Arab ⁢regional‌ contexts .

ThusAmerican-Israeli ‍demands regarding rapid disarming face indefinite futures once ⁣again implying Prime‍ minister Netanyahu‍ may resort preventing repeated‌ battlefield defeats opting widescale engagements‍ looming imminent critically⁤ testing extentsto adaptability⁣ enjoyedby Resistance allowing counterterrorism readiness ‌wards off aggressions maintaining grip uponLebanese sovereignterritories .⁣

News ⁢Sources: © webangah News Agency
English channel of the webangah news agency on Telegram
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