Israel Consolidates De Facto Sovereignty in West Bank Amidst Shifting Geopolitical Focus

According to the International Desk of Webangah News Agency, recent developments in the West Bank represent some of the most significant political and legal shifts in the region since the signing of the Oslo Accords. The decisions made by Israel, ranging from facilitating land appropriation for settlers to transferring urban competencies in Hebron and initiating the official registration and settlement of lands in so-called ‘Area C,’ are not merely administrative actions. Instead, they are new links in a protracted process aimed at consolidating Israel’s de facto sovereignty over a substantial portion of the West Bank.

These transformations are occurring as global public attention has been predominantly focused on the Gaza Strip following the Al-Aqsa Flood operation on October 7, 2023, and the ensuing war, leaving the West Bank with less media scrutiny. This international oversight vacuum has enabled Israel to advance structural steps that could have more profound and lasting implications than short-term military developments.

One of the most crucial changes involves the transfer of a significant portion of civil affairs management responsibilities in the West Bank from military structures to political entities supporting settlements. Under an agreement reached in 2022, extensive responsibilities in urban planning, permit issuance, and construction oversight were transferred from the army’s Civil Administration to a political body. This shift is considered a legal and administrative step toward transitioning from a state of ‘temporary occupation’ to a form of permanent management.

Since 1967, the West Bank has been governed under complete military rule. However, with the gradual transfer of authorities to Israeli civilian institutions, the line between military occupation and civil governance has become increasingly blurred. Such a change signifies a fundamental alteration in the nature of Israel’s presence in the territory.

The Israeli cabinet’s decision to formally commence the land registration and settlement process in Area C marks a turning point. This process had been halted since 1967. It has now been announced that parts of this area will be registered as ‘Israeli property’ within a few years. The practical implication of this action is that lands for which Palestinian owners cannot provide valid and up-to-date deeds may be registered as Israeli property.

Area C comprises approximately 60 percent of the West Bank’s total area. According to the Oslo Accords, its status was to be determined in final status negotiations. However, after three decades, not only have final negotiations not yielded results, but actions are now underway that could transform this temporary status into a permanent reality.

Under international law, the West Bank is considered occupied territory, and the occupying power does not have the right to make fundamental changes to land ownership regimes. Nevertheless, Israel, citing its specific interpretations of Ottoman and British Mandate laws, has declared vast swathes of Area C as state land or military zones over the decades. Formal land registration moves this situation from a level of de facto control to legal consolidation, an action that would be exceedingly difficult to reverse.

Concurrent with the land registration process, restrictions on selling land to Israelis have also been lifted. Laws that prohibited the sale of land to non-Arabs during the Jordanian rule and kept landowner information confidential have been discarded. Consequently, access to landowners’ names and details has become available, smoothing the path for direct or intermediary purchases.

While Palestinians face economic pressures, travel restrictions, and extensive difficulties in obtaining building permits, the opening of the land market could lead to a gradual transfer of ownership. This transfer may occur not through overt confiscation but through legal and financial mechanisms—a process that appears lawful but practically results in a change in the region’s demographic and ownership structure.

Developments in the city of Hebron serve as a clear illustration of these changes. Since 1997, the city has been divided into two sectors under a special protocol. Now, the transfer of municipal competencies within the Ibrahimi Mosque complex to the Israeli Civil Administration effectively diminishes the role of the Palestinian municipality in parts of the city. An independent municipal authority is also to be established to manage the affairs of settlers, an entity that would oversee services and planning without relying on Palestinian mechanisms.

Such a structure creates a dual system: a legal and administrative framework for settlers with full support, and a more restricted framework for Palestinians. Past experiences have shown that restrictions on building permits for Palestinians and the demolition of unlicensed homes, coupled with settlement expansion, have led to a gradual change in the region’s human fabric.

What is happening in Hebron could serve as a model for other areas, where urban control, public services, and spatial planning are gradually removed from Palestinian institutions.

The Palestinian Authority, formed under the Oslo Accords, was meant to be a prelude to the establishment of an independent state. However, with the transfer of key authorities in land and urban planning, its strategic functions are increasingly limited. In a scenario where control over land and resources remains with Israel, and the Authority is solely responsible for managing population affairs, the concept of sovereignty effectively vanishes.

Within such a framework, Palestinians may have separate administrative bodies and identity documents but will lack real authority over the land. This situation redefines the Authority’s role: an entity responsible for services and population management, without control over land, borders, or resources.

On the international stage, discussions about the establishment of a Palestinian state and the necessity of returning to negotiations continue. Some countries recognized a Palestinian state last year, but these actions have failed to halt the developments on the ground. The gap between diplomatic discourse and the evolving realities on the ground is widening daily.

If Area C, the geographic backbone of the West Bank, is officially consolidated within Israeli ownership, the remaining territory for a future state will be limited to a collection of disconnected areas. In such circumstances, the possibility of forming a state with contiguous territory and genuine sovereignty is further weakened.

The developments in the West Bank are not solely an internal issue but also have regional implications. Many normalization plans between Israel and Arab countries have been linked to progress toward establishing a Palestinian state. If the process of consolidating ownership and expanding settlements continues, public pressure in regional countries will increase, and the political space for overt cooperation will become more limited. Ultimately, what is unfolding in the West Bank today is more than a series of administrative decisions. This process could alter the equation of land and population in a way that makes a return to the Oslo framework or the realization of an independent Palestinian state exceedingly difficult. If this path continues unimpeded, the West Bank will gradually transform from a disputed territory into an area with consolidated Israeli sovereignty, ushering the Palestinian issue into a more complex and costly phase.

However, the fate of this process is not predetermined. Regional political developments, Palestinian internal cohesion, and the degree of diplomatic engagement from international actors can influence the future. What is clear, nonetheless, is the gradual change in the rules of the game—a legal and administrative transformation that, amidst relative global silence, is shaping a new reality on the ground.