Iran: Political pressures have affected the agency’s reports

According to the foreign policy group Tasnim news agency, the representative Permanent Secretary of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the United Nations Office and other international organizations based in Vienna in a memorandum of justification, the continuous political pressures exerted by a few specific countries, has reached a stage where even the technically resolved issues are subsequently in the agency reports contrary to what was agreed upon. , will change.

The Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office and other international organizations located in Vienna would like to express its opinions and observations as follows regarding Reports of the Director-General to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency contained in GOV/2024/29 and GOV/2024/26:

A) General comments

1. Islamic Republic of Iran completely It has adhered to its obligations, including the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/214), and has made every effort to enable the Agency to effectively carry out its verification activities in Iran, including monitoring and surveillance (C/S) measures on material and carry out nuclear activities in Iran, which is unique in the agency’s verification system. has not been regarded. Some items related to the JCPOA are exactly repeated in the NPT safeguards report, and conversely, some items related to the NPT safeguards are seen in the JCPOA report. For example, verification and monitoring activities related to centrifuge rotor and bellows manufacturing workshops should only be defined within the JCPOA reporting scope. The United States withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018 and the inability of the European Union/the three countries of Germany, England and France to implement their obligations, Iran to exercise its rights according to paragraphs 26 and 36 of the JCPOA, all voluntary clarifying measures beyond the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement (CSA), from Suspended the implementation of the amendment code 3.1 as specified in paragraph 13 of the introduction of JCPOA and also in paragraph 65 of its appendix one, in February 2021.
2. Iran’s decision to stop implementing its obligations under the JCPOA is fully in line with the country’s inherent rights according to Articles 26 and 36 of the JCPOA and was a response to the illegal withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA, along with the inability of three European countries to adhere to their commitments. This obvious fact cannot in any way be a basis for the three European countries to refuse to implement their obligations.
3. The decision of the three European countries to refuse to implement Their obligations to cancel sanctions specified in paragraph 20 of Appendix Five of the JCPOA on the day of transition (October 18, 2023) is an illegal act and another clear example of their complete non-compliance in violation of their commitments in both JCPOA documents and UN Security Council Resolution 2231.
4. As ​​for the issue of the so-called “two places”, it should be emphasized that the origin of the issue goes back to accusations that are primarily from one side The third of bad faith, namely the Israeli regime, which has no commitment to any of the instruments related to the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, especially the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and repeatedly contravenes the numerous resolutions of the IAEA General Conference, including especially Document No. 407, 1983; 444, 1985; 475, 1987 and 939, 1990, which are not respected by this regime, threaten to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities dedicated to peaceful purposes. This regime has been so insolent that it has recently even threatened Iran with a nuclear attack. Netanyahu’s statement, which was broadcast live around the world, in which he said: “Iran must face a credible nuclear threat” and his heritage minister, who said, “Using a nuclear bomb is one of the The attack options will be against Hamas” is a clear violation of international law.
5. From a legal point of view, the agency’s assessments in its report are based on information unreliable and unreliable documents provided by a regime that not only constantly conspires against Iran’s relations with the Agency, but also commits sabotage, attacks and threats to attack Iran along with this regime’s brutal and genocidal policy against the innocent people of Gaza, which is now no longer for society The world is fully recognized.
6. In view of increasing cooperation with the Agency in recent years, Iran has taken voluntary measures in the framework of several joint statements, including the statement 13 Esfand 1401 (March 4, 2023).
7. Recently, the continuous political pressure exerted by a few specific countries has reached a stage where Even technically resolved issues are subsequently changed in agency reports contrary to what was agreed upon. These politically motivated pressures prevent the agency from fulfilling its professional and impartial role. On various occasions, the director general expresses his feelings in his reports by using unconventional expressions, contrary to the necessity of the technical and objective procedure of such reports, which should be avoided. b) Comments in The report of the “background” section of the report (GOV/2024/29) 2024/29, it should be noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran repeatedly, including through explanatory notes INFCIRC/1159 dated November 23, 2023, INFCIRC/1131 dated September 14, 2023, INFCIRC/996 dated June 7, 2022, INFCIRC/967 dated 3 December 2021 and INFCIRC/1183 dated March 7, 2024 has emphasized that there are no places to be declared under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA). In addition, the agency has not provided reliable information, documents and evidence related to safeguards for its claim regarding the undeclared locations.
8. in paragraph 4 Iran once again emphasizes that there was no nuclear material or activity in the place known as Loizan-Shiyan. This location has been subject to extensive agency verification activities, including supplemental access, as specified in footnote 6 of this report, and the matter has been closed accordingly.
9. Regarding paragraphs 5 and 6, despite the absence of any material and nuclear activities that require notification, Iran has so far provided its explanations to the Agency. However, voluntary actions can also be considered within the framework of the modality to be agreed upon in line with the joint statement of March 4, 2023.
10. Paragraph 6 of the report states “…the Agency’s assessment of Iran’s undeclared nuclear activities at Marivan remains unchanged”, as in paragraph 6 As mentioned above, the agency’s assessment should not be based on unreliable and invalid documents and information. In addition, there is no added value in referring to certain previous arguments which, as a result of subsequent information, have confirmed and led to the resolution of this matter as set out in the Director-General’s previous report (GOV/2023/26). However, the relevant details are already reflected in para 8 of Explanatory Memorandum INFCIRC/1094 dated 7 June 2023.

c) Considerations about section C of the report (GOV/2024/29 ):

14. about paragraph 7 ” Varamin”, the following should be considered:

• As ​​explained many times by the Islamic Republic of Iran Given, there was no undeclared location (the declaration of which is required under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA).
• Claim to exist lacks reliable information and verified authentic documents, and is based only on fake and false documents provided by a rogue regime.
• The agency only refers to low-quality satellite images to assess that“… the containers left from Varamin finally went to Torquzabad They were transported…” is not enough and correct because thousands of similar containers are moving around the country. The claim of moving a container from one place to another cannot be a correct judgment based on such unprovable/inaccurate/unacceptable evidence.

15. In the case of paragraph 8 regarding “Turquzabad”, the following facts should be considered:

• The agency’s assessment is not based on valid information and evidence. Turquzabad is actually an industrial place that includes all kinds of warehouses and storage places for detergents, chemicals, food, fabrics and textiles, tires and auto parts, pipes and fittings and some industrial waste.
• As ​​it has been said many times, the site in question is an industrial waste warehouse where container handling has been a common activity. Moving containers from one industrial place to another which is a routine activity cannot be considered as a strong reason for any claim.
• In our extensive research in In the context of the history of activities carried out in this place, with the exception of vandalism, which is the most likely sign, no other reason for the presence of such particles can be considered.
• As for the agency’s incorrect assumption that the containers were moved from this location, the explanation that the agency’s assumption was incorrect has already been provided to it. However, Iran declares its readiness to provide further explanations within the framework of the agreed work method in line with the March 4, 2023 joint statement.

16. Regarding paragraph 9: The Agency had mentioned four undeclared sites in its previous reports and requested information that was later provided by Iran, resulting in the Agency reducing the number of sites to two. The item was reduced. Therefore, the false assumption of undeclared locations, which was based on unreliable information, was corrected as a result of Iran’s extensive cooperation in the framework of the joint statement. The remaining two locations can also be explored and resolved through mutual cooperation within a framework to be agreed in line with the March 4, 2023 joint statement.

Section C.2 Safeguard Report on Discrepancy in Nuclear Material Balance

17. Regarding paragraph 10, the following should be considered: =”text-align:justify”>Uranium metal resulting from the declared conversion experiments carried out in Jaber In Hayyan Multipurpose Laboratory (IRL-) which was received by Uranium Conversion Institute (IRK-) Isfahan, since 2003 many times in time intervals various, both quarterly and annually, have been verified by the agency and led to the issuance of the relevant statements 90(a) and 90(b) by the agency with the phrase “satisfactory “ .
18. In a letter dated August 9, 2023, in response to the agency’s question, Iran emphasized that the inconsistency of mentioning It was created in Isfahan Uranium Conversion Institute (IRK-) due to the different and irregular process of recovering uranium from waste materials, called “dirty waste” which contains various types of unknown elements as impurities. Basically, material differences between the start and end of the recovery process are technically predictable and unavoidable. Although the discrepancy in the recovery endpoint was accepted by Iran, the Agency was convinced that the amount originally claimed by the Agency was significantly lower than previously declared. For this purpose, several technical dialogue sessions were held on this issue between the Agency and Iran. In a technical discussion on November 8, 2023 in Vienna, Iran provided a presentation (screenshot) on the detailed recovery process and audit calculation of relevant materials at the Uranium Conversion Institute (IRK-) in Isfahan for the liquidation of dirty uranium metal tailings, based on solid technical documentation. . In order to resolve this issue, it was agreed in this meeting that the agency will carry out other verification activities at the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Institute (UCF) as soon as possible.
19. Further agency verification activities in this regard on November 21, 22, 2023; It was done on December 3, 4, 2023 and December 20, 2023. During these subsequent activities carried out at the Uranium Conversion Institute (IRK-) in Isfahan, the operator provided the details of the audit calculations for the recycling of metallic uranium waste. Despite the agreement made with the agency and the approval received on 12-21-2023 to provide an assessment including the results of the analysis of environmental samples and the destructive test taken at IRK-IRK until February 2024, the results of these verifications have not yet been shared with Iran. However, the agency admitted that the SRD value was much lower than its initial assessment.
18. Regarding paragraph 11, it should be mentioned that:

• During the meeting of the Deputy Director General of the Agency In safeguards affairs and the Deputy Director General of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran in Tehran on January 29, 2024 and as a result of the proposal of the Agency’s Deputy Director General in Safeguards Affairs, the technical talks ended. The Deputy Director General of the Agency for Safeguard Affairs suggested that without further technical discussions, a correction in the audit records -IRK with the agreed amount, should be submitted to the Agency by Iran, so that this issue can be resolved without any conflict with the IRL Institute. Based on this, the required modified nuclear material audit reports were provided to the IAEA through a letter dated February 7, 2024. The revised nuclear material audit reports indicate that all of the declared uranium in solid waste sent from the Jaber Ibn Hayyan Multipurpose Laboratory (JHL) to the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) for liquidation has been received by UCF, and a shortfall has been reported. It was only related to UCF (IRK-).
• According to the agreement, Iran corrected the relevant audit records and in return, the agency issued a correction statement. provided for the IRK- and IRL- institutions. The agency stated in its statement 90(a) (dated 02/21/2024) that discrepancies in the amount of uranium in solid waste sent from JHL is resolved(Resolved)>. This issue means the resolution of the said inconsistency is also exactly as “resolved”. and seasoned” is reflected in the Subtitle of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Report No. 23 (GOV/2024/7) dated February 26, 2024. But surprisingly, without mentioning the reason, in the same day, the word “resolved” was changed to “rectified” (Paragraph 15 of Safeguard Report GOV/2024/8). Subsequently, these two reports (Padmani and JERGAMI) were unprofessionally republished by the Agency on March 2, 2024, without issuing an amendment. There is no justifiable reason for such an unjustified deviation from the agreement and hasty change of distributed reports. This approach shows the presence of foreign political pressures {on the agency} that weakens the credibility of the agency.

19. Regarding paragraph 12: In a letter dated May 22, 2024, the IAEA requested Iran to re-evaluate its uranium metal production tests that have been continuously verified since 2003. In this regard, the following points should be considered:

• As ​​explained above, metallic uranium It has been under the Agency’s continuous surveillance and custody (C/S) measures (seals) at the Jaber Ibn Hayyan Multipurpose Laboratory (JHL) while housed at the JHL Institute (IRL-) and has been repeatedly verified by the Agency since 2003. and for which the Agency subsequently issued Statements 90(a) and 90(b) asserting that the verification was “satisfactory“ Is. It should be noted that no activity has been done on this material that has changed its status.
• Research and development project for uranium production The metal using UF₄ was notified to the Agency in 2003 and was rigorously approved in 2003-2004 and later in 2009 and finally in 2014. In this research and development project, in addition to the main products, some different types of scraps such as scraps, heterogeneous scraps, etc. were produced. All these materials have been subjected to various verifications by the agency.
• The agency in its statement dated 02-12-2014 clearly stated in its assessment that “All declared nuclear material has been audited and there is no indication of the presence, production or processing of undeclared nuclear material”. The Agency went on to note in its report (GOV/2015/68) that“…the Agency reassessed this information in 2014 to determine the amount of natural uranium involved in the context of uncertainty associated with nuclear material audits. and its associated measurements”.
• Materials received by UCF (IRK-) from JHL (IRL- ) has always been under the seal of the agency and has been approved by the agency and the operator, and the data of the sending institution has been accepted. Since the Material Balance Area (MBA) of the receiving institution (IRK1) accepted the data of the sending institution, naturally there were no Sender-Receiver Disputes (SRD) to report. Material verification was done at UCF, the deficit caused by material processing cannot be considered as SRD. Also, the deficit cannot be considered as a reason to change the audit reports of the JHL (IRL-) originating institution. The recovery has been identified at UCF (IRK-) and not at this institution’s receiving site, so it cannot definitely be attributed to the institution of origin, the Jabir Ibn Hayyan Multipurpose Laboratory (IRL-).
• The letter of May 22, 2024 contained in the report of the Director General of the Agency was received by Iran only a few days before the publication of the report. According to Al-Qaeda, to avoid any ambiguity and create a falsehood, this agency letter should not have been hastily reflected in the report without Iran’s response. Given that balance of relevant uranium material was concluded in the uranium metal production tests conducted at JHL in 2014 (see Statement 90(b) above), the Agency’s reopening of a closed matter after an already concluded process, without The doubt jeopardizes the credibility of the agency’s verification system, including its audit statements.

20. Regarding Corrective Code 3.1:

• Accepting the implementation of Corrective Code 3.1 including reflected actions It was in paragraph 13 of the introduction of JCPOA and also paragraph 65 of its appendix one. Following the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and the non-implementation of the obligations of the European Union and the three European countries Germany, England and France under this agreement, Iran, in exercising its rights according to paragraphs 26 and 36 of the JCPOA, decided to only comply with its obligations within the framework of the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement (CSA). ) to act. However, in good faith and under the understanding reached with the Director General, Iran has already provided general information about the planning of new institutions (including Iran, Hormuz, Sistan and Baluchistan, etc.) and announced that the relevant safeguard information It will be provided to the Agency at the appointed time.
• The Director General in his report pointed to the uniqueness of Iran’s performance in the field of the 3/1 Amendment Code. It has ( Iran is the only country with significant nuclear activities in which the agency is implementing a comprehensive safeguard agreement but does not implement the provisions of the corrective code ). In this regard, the uniqueness of the Brotherhood should also be repeated, with the multiplicity of inspections, the trust and transparency measures beyond the Comprehensive Saddic Agreement and the Additional Protocol. This attribute of the agreement made Iran the only country with a strong verification regime.
• Iran under the law of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Strong> The “Strategic Action Plan to Remove Sanctions and Protect the Interest of the Iranian Nation” , in the formulation of his rights in paragraphs 26 and 36, decided to fulfill his obligations under the Comprehensive Saddic Agreement. It should not be expected that Iran will fully fulfill its obligations under the continuation of unjustified unilateral sanctions.

d) Comments on the section D Strong> (GOV/2024/29) : Joint Statement (Sections 20-17, 22 and 34)

21. in the joint statement of March 4, 2023, two important elements, the framework of the Comprehensive Saddam Agreement and the method of work, must be considered . The Islamic Republic of Iran has allowed the agency to install nine surveillance cameras by goodwill and even until the agreement reached on the methods. In addition, Iran allowed the IAEA Secretariat to successfully carry out the camera and save the recorded data. The progress of interactions with the Agency had to be appreciated by the Board of Governors.
22. obviously the further implementation of a joint statement requires Iran-I agency dialogue. The procedure is to be done by bilaterally agreed.
23. in paragraphs 21, 27 and 33 contained in the Gov/2024/29 Report and 29 Also, paragraphs 21, 22 and 33 of the GOV/2024/26 reports on Iran’s sovereignty to cancel the appointment of a few inspectors, the following should be considered: “Style =” Text-Align: Justify “> As provided in Article 9 (a) (II) from the Comprehensive Saffron Agreement between Iran and the Agency (infCirc/214), it has been explicitly stated that Iran’s right to sovereignty for its sovereignty Protesting the cancellation of the appointment of agency inspectors reserves not only at the time of the appointment but at any time after the appointment.
24. Currently, the total number of 120 inspectors appointed is owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran Agency. This clearly shows that Iran tends to enable the agency to perform its tasks with different experienced inspectors.
apply this The right does not directly or indirectly affect the agency’s ability to carry out its inspections in Iran.
25. while the Islamic Republic of Iran on two occasions ( October 2023 and February 2024) The appointment of 14 new agency’s proposed inspectors has accepted, but unfortunately this issue is not correctly reflected in the report.
As mentioned in paragraph 23 and paragraph 24 of Gov/2024/29, the Agency’s Director General’s visit to Tehran and Isfahan (to participate in the International Conference on Nuclear Science and Technology) and subsequently travel Deputy Director General of the IAEA to Tehran, with various officials, including Dr. Amir Abdullahian, the late Foreign Minister, Dr. Bagheri Kennedy, Deputy Foreign Minister, as well as Mr. Islami, Vice President and Head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization and The Deputy Director of International Affairs, Legal and Parliament was discussed. During these talks, the parties, while discussing various issues, including the implementation of a joint statement, agreed to consult their consultations at the right time after the specific conditions arising from the testimony of the President, the Foreign Minister and other companions in the air accident,
24. in paragraph 26 of the General Statement: It has been officially stated repeatedly that nuclear weapons have never been placed in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s defense doctrine does not have. Therefore, there is no room for interpreting the statements of public people. The Director General is not expected to make a conclusion or statement based on individual views. This conclusion is neither professional nor legally justified. These public statements, which have been misinterpreted several times and do not correspond to Iran’s official stance, can, in any case, be abused by others to undermine Iran’s obligations under the NPT.

Comments on the section report ” Summary Strong> “ Report (GOV/2024/29) :

26. Nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran are completely peaceful and the claims made by third party body are not valid and have no justification.
27. Iran has voluntarily allowed access to the agency and provided information and explanations about the alleged locations. However, the Agency did not submit a valid documents to Iran’s claim of “nuclear materials and relevant nuclear activities” to Iran and Iran was not obliged to respond to agency requests for invalid and fabricated documents. However, unfortunately, the Agency considers all fabricated documents and fake information provided by the Israeli regime, which has led to the conclusions of the agency based on inaccurate and unreliable assumptions.
In connection with the cancellation inspectors, the Agency must fully respect Iranian law in accordance with the Comprehensive Safety Agreement, including Article 9. Any attempt to divert the sovereignty of member states in contrast to the comprehensive sacrifice agreement of the relevant sacrifice is unacceptable and should not create a background that endangers the rights of the member states. During the visit of the Director General and Deputy Director General of the Agency for Safeguards to Iran and meeting with senior officials, both parties agreed to discuss various issues, including the implementation of a joint statement, after passing the specific conditions arising out of martyrdom. The President, Foreign Minister and other companions in an air accident continue to consult at the right time. As mentioned earlier, in Numerous cases have been officially announced that nuclear weapons have no place in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s defense doctrine. Therefore, there is no reason for any misrepresentation of public individual statements. The Director General is not expected to conclude or make a statement based on individual views. Any conclusion based on public statements is neither professional nor legal.

and) Conclusion /p>

31. the Islamic Republic of Iran has cooperated with the Agency in the framework of the CSA Agreement (CSA). It should be reiterated that all Iran’s nuclear materials and activities have been fully announced to the Agency and have been verified by the Agency.
32. Islamic Republic of Iran to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The right to expect the agency to perform its reports on verification activities in Iran on the basis of neutrality, professional, and objectively. To be, all Iran’s nuclear materials and activities have been fully reported to the agency and have passed through a very strong verification system. Although the Islamic Republic of Iran has no obligation to answer agency questions based on fabricated and invalid documents, Iran has voluntarily and cooperative approach, providing all the necessary information, backup documents and access to the Agency.
33. the Islamic Republic of Iran, while emphasizing the importance and value of cooperation provided to the Agency, reminds the agency that these constructive cooperation should not be weakened by short-sighted political interests. Accordingly, the Agency is obliged to re-demonstrate its rationality in dealing with such issues with the aim of preventing the larger image of cooperation between Iran and the Agency. Readmore-container “> Grossi: I had a constructive conversation with Bagheri
    Gross request from Iran to conduct high-level negotiations

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