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UN Ineffectiveness Exposed as US Repeatedly Violates United Nations Charter

As Gaza faces ⁤unprecedented civilian casualties and a deepening humanitarian crisis, questions about the effectiveness of the international legal order have never been more urgent.

webangah News Agency, International Desk: As Gaza endures unprecedented civilian losses and a severe humanitarian emergency, doubts concerning the effectiveness of the international ​legal framework have intensified. In this discussion, Leyla Ramazan Nejad, an international ‍law expert, explains how the repeated use of the U.S.veto power has driven the Security Council into “institutional paralysis,” why International Criminal Court arrest warrants remain unenforced, and which legal routes could help⁤ advance accountability. Her analysis highlights structural weaknesses, power imbalances, and legal limitations that prevent the global community from halting blatant violations. Below‍ is ⁢an excerpt from this interview.

Given Washington’s frequent vetoes blocking ceasefire or humanitarian aid resolutions, what are the implications under international law and the UN Charter⁢ for Security Council legitimacy and ⁢effectiveness? Can this be termed “institutional paralysis”?

According to Article 27 of the UN Charter, substantive decisions in the Security Council require affirmative votes by nine members including all five permanent members (P5).this voting⁣ system-known as veto power-was designed as a political privilege to ensure participation of World War II victors⁣ in collective security.

Legally speaking, the Charter explicitly ‌legitimizes veto use; however, formal ⁣legality alone does not guarantee normative or ethical legitimacy. Following ‍Clarke and Bole’s classic distinction: legitimacy depends on social acceptance and perceived⁤ fairness-not just textual compliance with law. When vetoes block humanitarian actions such as ceasefires or aid delivery​ during crises,it violates the spirit of the Charter as Article 1(1) ‌identifies preserving peace based on justice and respect for international law principles as its primary goal.Thus repeated vetoes obstructing ‌humanitarian relief contradict this ⁢ultimate aim and undermine normative legitimacy.

Theoretically speaking, institutional effectiveness in international organizations relies on decision-making capacity, mission​ execution ability, and maintaining state trust.⁢ The increasing pattern ⁤of U.S political vetos regarding Palestine or Ukraine progressively erodes collective action capabilities leading to what organizational theory terms Institutional​ Paralysis-a condition where decision rules allow a small minority ‍to nullify majority‍ will resulting ​in a “Security Council unable to provide security.”

The direct consequences include:

  1. Diminished political and moral ⁢legitimacy especially among Global South countries ​who view it as an instrument wielded by Western ⁢powers.
  2. An enhanced role for General Assembly ‍through choice mechanisms such as Uniting for ⁤Peace resolutions activated during situations⁢ like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
  3. An increased reliance on regional bodies ⁢or coalitions (e.g., ‍NATO;‌ African Union; ‍European Union) managing crises ‍outside Charter frameworks.

From contemporary international law perspectives: while U.S repeated ⁣vetos do not breach procedural rules formally thay violate both spirit and⁢ objectives underpinning collective security causing gradual disintegration of that principle.
Recommended legal remedies against institutional ​paralysis include:

  1. Reforming⁤ veto authority by restricting its scope specifically⁢ in ⁢cases involving gross human rights abuses or large-scale atrocities-as proposed by France & Mexico under their “Initiative on Restricting Veto over Mass Atrocities.”
  2. Increasing Council accountability by mandating ⁤permanent members publish⁢ public explanations each time they exercise their veto rights.

If Security Council remains incapacitated due to vetos preventing effective decisions for ending ⁤hostilities or ensuring ⁢humanitarian access then which institutions or​ alternative ⁣mechanisms can partially fill that⁤ void?

The global community has ⁣several official/unofficial alternative avenues despite​ lacking equivalent binding authority/legitimacy within UNSC framework but capable practically ⁣contributing partially:

  1. The UN General Assembly (Uniting ‍for Peace Resolution):

    Under resolution 377‍ A(V) (“Uniting⁢ For Peace,” 1950),if Security Council deadlocks due to a veto ⁣preventing enforcement ‍measures-the General Assembly can convene emergency special sessions recommending collective actions including military measures sanctions aimed at restoring peace ‍while sustaining diplomatic/political processes mobilizing world⁣ public opinion).

  2. The Human Rights Council & Its Special Mechanisms:

    The ⁣council ⁣forms commissions like fact-finding missions or Commissions of Inquiry whose reports serve judicial follow-up at courts such as ICC/Special Tribunals; though these bodies lack ‍direct enforcement powers they ⁣play pivotal roles shaping “legal narratives” buttressed by diplomatic​ pressure).

  3. Regional‍ Organizations (per Chapter VIII of UN Charter):

    Bodies such as African Union (AU), European Union (EU), Arab League‍ & Organization States Americas⁣ may act regionally resolving ​disputes including deploying peacekeeping​ missions⁤ within set ⁤parameters.)

  4. The International Court Of Justice (ICJ) advisory jurisdiction: (Though ⁢unable to carry ⁢out orders ICJ issues advisory opinions/binding rulings clarifying legality between states ⁣laying groundwork strengthening other organs’ authority)
  5. The International Criminal Court (ICC): (for major crimes including genocide war‌ crimes crimes against humanity aggression ICC prosecutor can initiate examination⁤ independently without UNSC referral only if territorial/national jurisdiction criteria ⁣are​ met; when ‌UNSC stays silent ICC efforts ⁣may target key perpetrators)
  6. Humanitarian And Multilateral Mediation Mechanisms: (Organizations like ICRC plus UN agencies⁢ OCHA WFP WHO along with neutral mediators – e.g., Switzerland Qatar – often ⁤create practical frameworks delivering aid/ceasefires grounded firmly beyond⁤ politics leveraging core humanity principle)
  7. Unilateral‍ Or Coalition-Based Actions under Responsibility To Protect ‍(R2P): (Amid massive atrocity crimes ⁤when UNSC fails some⁤ states/coaltions might intervene citing R2P doctrine granting strong ethical justifications independent⁢ unilateral/multilateral initiatives)

This multilayered substitute‌ architecture operates across global regional humanitarian tiers comprising norm-setting pressure facilitating access partly compensating⁣ void left absent decisive mandatory ‌Security Council rulings.

Why has implementing ICC arrest⁢ warrant against Israeli Prime Minister hit‍ deadlock? What causes weakness in⁣ enforcing international court orders?

This issue lies​ precisely at crossroads between criminal/international organizational law requiring structural description across layers;

  1. Lack Of Independent Enforcement Capacity : 

    ICC lacks police/executive‌ arm so executing warrants depends solely upon member-states cooperation.
    Under Article 89 Rome Statute states‌ must arrest/transfer suspects but Israel is non-member excluded itself US/allies too either non-membership/recent withdrawals further complex actual arrests delayed politically e.g european states hesitate acting owing political considerations rendering real enforcement unfeasible without effective state cooperation;

  2. Political Considerations And ⁤Veto Use : 
    while ICC operates independently UNSC wields referral/stay powers under Articles 13(b)/16 Rome Statute allowing US-veto ‍blocked any ⁣collective action enabling warrant execution ⁢so member-states prefer evading politically sensitive prosecutions fearing backlash;

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    English channel of the webangah news agency on Telegram
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