Tel Aviv: “Absolute Victory” Over Resistance Is Impossible
The Israeli Internal Security Studies center,affiliated with Tel Aviv university,acknowledged that Tel Aviv can no longer attain “absolute victory” in the traditional military sense against Hamas and Hezbollah. According to a new report shared by webangah news Agency, based on sources including Al-Nashra website and Mehr News Agency, the center reevaluated basic concepts within Israel’s military doctrine-particularly the notions of victory and decisive triumph-in light of major developments in conflicts with Palestinians and arabs as the 1970s through wars in Gaza, Lebanon, as well as recent engagements with Iran and Yemen.
Retired Israeli General Tamir Hayman, former head of Military intelligence who authored the report, analyzed a shift in mindset within Israel’s security establishment. This shift reflects growing recognition that traditional methods are ineffective for achieving decisive military victories against contemporary non-state armed groups.
The report highlights a strategic pivot: emphasis has moved from military victory toward political and strategic success. This shift reveals a deep crisis in Tel Aviv’s capacity to impose its will in prolonged complex conflicts. Consequently,the definition of victory must move beyond conventional frameworks centered on outright military defeat that strips adversaries of their capability or will to continue fighting.
The new concept of victory involves achieving limited objectives that allow Israeli officials to justify ending operations even if opponents remain relatively cohesive or retain some power. This evolution implicitly acknowledges that theaters where Israel has fought over decades no longer permit outright military conquests.
The center underlines that as the 1970s political leaders have avoided demanding unequivocal victories over non-state actors like the Palestine Liberation Association historically-and presently over Hamas and Hezbollah-opting rather for attainable goals designed to avoid protracted wars or endless attrition campaigns.
The report further exposes an internal doctrinal crisis within Israel’s security thinking: Tel Aviv can no longer conceive full victories in modern warfare but relies on politically framed successes defined by improved security conditions rather than total enemy destruction. This conceptual transformation carries broad strategic consequences-shifting efforts from uncompromising militarism toward external political arrangements-and characterizes Israel’s power as temporary and partial.
Hayman stresses this situation illustrates that amid non-state actors’ rise, Israel confronts inherent limits on its military power. He implicitly admits strategic victories cannot be secured by force alone; for example, Hamas’ sustained political-social presence in Gaza erodes any long-term Israeli gains from battlefield achievements.
Ultimately,the report concludes that within israeli discourse victory represents a prolonged political process contingent upon external arrangements and reshaping regional environments-not an assured result guaranteed by military might alone.
