China Pursues ‘Complementary Deterrence’ Strategy, Integrating Military, Economic, and Technological Power
According to the International Desk of Webangah News Agency, the global power competition has entered a new phase where dominance is no longer solely measured by the number of warships or missile ranges. Today, ‘power’ is a synthesis of military strength, economic prowess, technological advancement, and diplomatic engagement. Nations that can harmonize these components more effectively will possess a greater advantage in managing crises and containing rivals.
Within this framework, China is pursuing a model that can be described as ‘complementary deterrence.’ This strategy does not rely exclusively on military threats but simultaneously leverages economic, technological, and political instruments. Classical deterrence aims to ‘raise the cost of war’ for an adversary to prevent conflict. However, China’s new model escalates this cost not just through weaponry, but through a network of tools ranging from trade and investment to strategic technologies and diplomatic relations. In essence, China seeks to convey to its rivals that any tense action against Beijing’s interests will not be met with a response confined to the military arena alone, but will also carry economic and technological consequences.
This model operates on the principle that elements of power must function in concert. A country possessing significant military might, a robust supply chain, advanced technology, and active political relationships enjoys multiplied deterrence. In such a scenario, an adversary faces a comprehensive set of costs and risks rather than considering a single factor. This can be likened to a ‘multilayered system’ encompassing military (naval, air, missile), technological (space, artificial intelligence, communications), economic (trade, investment, energy, supply chains), and diplomatic (coalition building, mediation, relationship management) layers. The crucial aspect is China’s endeavor to integrate these layers rather than treating them as separate entities, employing them in a coordinated and complementary fashion.
The Taiwan issue serves as a clear illustration of this multilayered deterrence model. In recent years, China has bolstered its naval and missile capabilities while concurrently expanding its use of surveillance and intelligence technologies. This progression means that any external actor contemplating intervention in a potential crisis faces a more complex calculation, as the cost of involvement is no longer solely military. Alongside this hard power, the economic dimension is equally significant. China is a key trading partner for a large portion of East Asia, with numerous regional industries and markets intrinsically linked to trade with China. This interdependence creates a form of non-military deterrence; instability in the region carries substantial economic costs for many actors. Consequently, even nations with political disagreements with China are compelled to factor the economic ramifications of any crisis into their decision-making.
On a global scale, the rivalry between China and the United States demonstrates that the primary arena of power in the 21st century is not exclusively military. Competition over semiconductors, artificial intelligence, export controls, and supply chain management has effectively become a ‘silent war’ shaping the future of global power. In response to Western technological pressure, China has made substantial investments in indigenous technologies, from chip manufacturing to digital infrastructure and industrial capacity enhancement. The objective is clear: to reduce vulnerability to sanctions and restrictions. A nation that can increasingly meet its vital needs domestically gains greater bargaining power, diminishing the impact of external pressure. This represents another form of deterrence, one forged not on the battlefield but in factories, laboratories, and supply networks.
In the Middle East, China pursues a similar multilayered model, albeit with a key distinction: Beijing generally seeks to define its role primarily through economic and diplomatic engagement rather than extensive military presence. For China, energy security, maritime trade routes, and regional market stability hold strategic importance. By expanding economic ties and fostering technological and infrastructure cooperation with regional nations, Beijing effectively increases the ‘cost of instability.’ In other words, as economic relationships and joint projects grow, any crisis threatening trade and energy does not solely impact regional countries but also affects China’s interests. This intertwining of interests can contribute to a form of indirect deterrence, prompting regional and extra-regional actors to consider the impact of a crisis on their major economic partners in their calculations.
The experience of China highlights a crucial point for the Middle East: effective deterrence is not achieved by relying solely on military tools. Defensive capabilities are important but insufficient. Countries that can complement their defense strength with sustainable economic capacity, strategic technology, and active diplomacy increase the cost of threats or pressure against them. In such circumstances, rivals and adversaries face a spectrum of consequences, including political and economic costs, as well as technological and trade limitations. China’s ‘complementary deterrence’ model signals a shift towards a hybrid approach in contemporary deterrence, where coordination among military, technological, economic, and diplomatic power is of decisive importance. In a multipolar and competitive world, nations that can effectively deploy various instruments of power in a unified direction will be more successful, reducing the likelihood of conflict while preserving strategic interests at a lower cost.
If there is one key takeaway from China’s experience for the Middle East, it is this: deterrence in the new era requires an ‘intelligent combination’ more than ever before—a blend of defense, economy, technology, and diplomacy, rather than reliance on a single tool. This analysis was provided by a Ph.D. student in International Relations.
