The impact of the Gaza war on the relations between Russia and Türkiye

According to the international group Tasnim news agency, the experience of the last period of cold relations Turkey and Russia are behind us. Last summer, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan seriously tested Moscow’s red lines, making dramatic friendly gestures toward Kiev. However, with the occurrence of the Al-Aqsa operation, the Turkish and Russian authorities understood the war in the Middle East in a unified way and considered it a suitable opportunity to criticize the Israeli regime and its “western supporters”.

Moscow and Ankara, realizing their position on one side of the conflict, will begin to strengthen bilateral contacts and bring closer their positions on disputed regional issues. But it is unlikely that understanding on some common issues will be a guarantee against actions that the other party will not call “stab in the back”.

Sinusoidal Relations

This summer, Erdogan took several decisions at once, which the Kremlin often called unfriendly. In July 2023, during Zelenskiy’s visit to Ankara, Erdogan emphasized that “Ukraine undoubtedly deserves NATO membership”.

Furthermore, in early 2023 and After the presidential election in Turkey, Erdoğan, in an unexpected move, handed over five commanders of the Azov battalion to Kiev. Commanders whom the Russian political and security system considered symbols of “Ukrainian neo-Nazism” and according to the Moscow-Ankara agreement, these people should have spent their imprisonment in Turkey.

Kremlin in it Zaman was busy preparing to deal with the beginning of the Ukrainian counteroffensive and Prigozhin’s rebellion. Therefore, in response, Moscow had to be content with verbal criticism of Ankara’s actions, which, of course, was expressed by several Russian officials and not by the first-level officials of this country. Russia’s only serious reaction to Ankara’s positions was its refusal to participate and renew the grain contract despite all the requests of Turkey and President Erdogan.

The Turkish leader knew very well that Moscow was in a position Relatively vulnerable. But at that time he was only testing red lines and had no intention of destroying bilateral relations.

Thus, in early September, Putin agreed to meet with Erdogan in Sochi, although in First, it was said that the President of Russia will go to Turkey. The talks that took place on September 4, contrary to expectations, did not lead to the revival of the grain trade and in fact did not bring any significant results, but the main point of the meeting was that it sent a single signal to the world that everything is fine in relations with Moscow. And Ankara is going right.

The clear reason for this friendship is the dynamics of commercial and economic relations. Is. In 2022, the trade turnover between Russia and Turkey increased by more than 80% and reached 62 billion dollars, and in 2023 it reached 65 billion dollars, and even better numbers are predicted for this year.

But in foreign policy, everything is somewhat more complicated and different. Traditional differences and contradictions in approaches and positions regarding Syria, Libya or, for example, Nagorno-Karabakh have not disappeared. However, in recent years, the parties have always tried to maintain their balance without bringing the situation to an open confrontation.

But this time, in the background of intensifying conflicts between the Palestinians and the occupiers. Zionist, Russia and Turkey find themselves in the same camp. Such a position has not happened before in any of the important international issues, and it has made many analysts expect a closer relationship between the two countries’ declared positions.

In fact, as the report Regarding the October 24 phone conversation between Erdogan and Putin, the Kremlin said the positions of Moscow and Ankara “virtually coincide, and both countries are focused on implementing the famous two-state formula”.

In different directions

The positions of the two countries on the Palestinian issue are really surprisingly similar. But each of them has reached this common point by following their different motivations and interests. When Moscow talks about Israel as an occupying power through its Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Vassily Nebenzia, it intends to present Russia as one of the leaders of the Global South and the non-Western world.

On the other hand, Erdoğan claims to be the leader of the Islamic world and it is no coincidence that after the October 17 incident at Al-Ahli Baptist Hospital, he strongly attacks Israel by changing his tone and words. Previously, the speeches of the Turkish leader were completely limited to criticizing Netanyahu’s actions, but then Erdogan’s positions became openly anti-Israeli.

For Russia, the open support of Hamas movement in the aftermath It happened after the attack on Ukraine. It means reducing relations with Israel and getting closer to Iran, as the main supporter of Palestinian resistance movements.

Before October 7 and the Al-Aqsa storm operation, the trip of Palestinian delegations to Moscow could be seen as an attempt by The Kremlin should be considered to mediate between the different Palestinian factions, Fatah and Hamas. However, these calls are now perceived (primarily by Tel Aviv) from a completely different angle. But Russia, which has entered into a close alliance with Iran, is not very worried about this.

It should be said about Erdogan, he has long supported the resistance of Hamas and allowed him to live and be present. It has provided some Hamas commanders in Turkish territory. The ideological base of the Turkish president comes from Islamist circles close to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement. So supporting Palestinian fighters is ideologically important to him.

In the early days of the conflict, Erdogan tried to maneuver between Israel and Hamas (and, according to some sources, even senior Hamas leaders expelled from Istanbul). But considering the global situation, he very quickly decided to unequivocally defend the Palestinian fighters and the people of Gaza in his declared policies. As a result, Moscow and Ankara by adopting policies Various people sacrificed their relations with Tel Aviv. This decision removes Russia and Turkey from the list of potential mediators between Israel and the Palestinian sides, and the Turkish leadership’s idea of ​​creating a system of guarantor countries to help resolve the problem seems unlikely to materialize.

The interaction of the two countries with Hamas cannot be called special and effective because, in relation to the representatives of the political office of the movement, Moscow and Ankara have not yet reached a conclusion on the issue of the release of the hostages; Just unlike Qatar and Egypt, which in connection with the military branch of Hamas, have been able to conduct several rounds of negotiations with Israel and achieve success.

But such a policy allows the leaders of Russia and Turkey to repeatedly accuse the policies of the West, especially the United States, in the region, which is good from the point of view of attracting the public opinion of domestic audiences and countries Alignment is very important.

This type of stance will be effective in the Russian presidential elections and the municipal elections in Turkey, especially since the ruling party of Turkey led by Erdogan is trying to win the municipal seats. in Istanbul and Ankara from the opposition parties.

Putin, accusing the United States of trying to “create chaos in the Middle East”, asserted that the West is the source of all the problems in Russia and It is the world, he emphasizes. In the same way, Erdogan, who criticizes the Western world for “crusades”, so that through the pressure of anti-Western public opinion, he can receive concessions from the West.

However, such rhetoric in no way means that Erdogan intends to end relations with NATO or the European Union. It is not a coincidence that two days before his high-profile speech in the Turkish parliament in support of Hamas, he presented the protocol for Sweden’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

So it is unlikely that the Kremlin be able to categorize Turkey as an important partner in the fight against the West alongside itself and the southern countries. This is due to the fact that if Erdogan needs to show loyalty to NATO and his Western partners (as requested by Sweden), he will do so regardless of his relations with Moscow.

Author: Mehdi Saif Tabrizi, a researcher in the field of Russia and the Caucasus

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