What can be the punishment for Armenia’s Western approach from Russia?

According to the international group Tasnim news agency, during the 6 years that Nicole Pashinyan was the leader of Armenia, there have been many talks about a fundamental revision of Armenia’s relations with Russia, and each time Moscow can claim in response that trade exchanges between the countries are stable, military-technical cooperation continues, and even in resolving the issue. Russian Karabakh is trying to improve the fate of its official ally, Armenia. Now that the Armenians have finally lost Karabakh completely, they wonder if they should still count Russia as their main ally?

But the main question lies elsewhere. It lies in “how the Kremlin can punish Armenia for changing its foreign policy”. /strong>

For a long time, there is no news about the improvement of relations between Moscow and Yerevan. Instead, there are enough sharp gestures that have worried not only the Russian Foreign Ministry, but also the country’s security forces.

For example: the criminal case against Yuri Khachaturov , the former Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, or Robert Kocharian, the former president of Armenia, who opened in 2018, or Pashinyan’s admission that the Iskander missiles provided by Russia in the 2020 war “did not work or only 10% of them worked.”

However, in recent months these statements have been transformed from the level of speeches and interviews to practical actions. When the leadership of Armenia announces within a few weeks that it will stop participating in the collective security agreement, the desire to join the European Union, and the departure of Russian border guards from Yerevan’s Zvartnots airport, it is clear that the revision of previous relations is not rhetorical, but a reality. /p>

Previously, the statements of the Armenian authorities that Russia does not fulfill its obligations to its allies were mostly complaints and were expressed cautiously, and always about returning to the previous format by Yerevan authorities expressed readiness. For example, in the spring of 2023, Pashinyan did not rule out the possibility of establishing the mission of the Collective Agreement Organization on the border of Armenia and Azerbaijan, if this organization “determines its area of ​​responsibility in Armenia and the South Caucasus”.

But now the result is something else. Yerevan has been ignoring the events of the Collective Security Treaty Organization for a year and a half and does not participate in the meetings or military exercises of this pact. In this regard, Pashinyan said in an interview with France 24 channel on the eve of Russia’s Defender of the Fatherland Day that he has “frozen” Armenia’s participation in this organization.

Armen Grigorian” also spoke in the same direction and called relying on Moscow from the very beginning of independence as a “strategic mistake” and further, Armenia officially announced the suspension of the work of Russian border guards at the Yerevan airport. This gap could have been filled by the visit of Ukrainian President Zelensky to Yerevan, which was apparently postponed for some reason.

All these are not just complaints, but concrete actions. The priorities of Armenia’s foreign policy have changed and it seems that the new lines have already been drawn. Yerevan’s strategic cooperation with Moscow has reached its end. Of course, the issue of the Gyumri military base will most likely remain silent for now, but even the departure of the border guards from the Yerevan airport will make Armenia’s position completely different. For example, the conditions of the Russian peacekeeping forces in Karabakh prove that several thousand military personnel will not be a political factor if all conditions or at least most of them are not met.

Confrontation scenarios

Armenia has to accept the possible consequences of its separation from Russia and pay its price. to pay But the question that arises is, “How will we be punished?” After several months of reflection in Armenia, they came to the conclusion that the worst things have already happened.

In Yerevan, they believe that Armenia has already paid the price for this split and separation from Russia, and the price was Karabakh. This position may seem naïve for a small country of three million that is heavily dependent on imports from Russia. However, Russia doesn’t really have many ways to punish Armenia, and none of them seem effective.

• Let’s start with the worst case scenario. Change of power or political coup with the help of opposition forces and various paramilitary organizations in Armenia. In fact, many veterans of the two Karabakh wars hate Pashinyan, and now 100,000 Armenian refugees from Karabakh have been added to them. But in recent years, the assumption that the people of Karabagh will come to Yerevan and start the revolution has repeatedly shown its impossibility in practice.

Protests from There were supporters of Karabakh, but even in the most emotional moments, in the third war in 2023, their number was much less than expected, and the anger of the people in these protests was not only against Pashinyan, but also against the former officials of Khankandi (Artsakh), international organizations And it even included Russia.

Even if we assume that early elections will be held in the country again, the refugees of Karabakh cannot participate in them according to the law. Although their passports are slightly different from ordinary Armenian passports, the Armenian government only recognizes them as travel documents and does not consider their owners as Armenian citizens until they go through the legal process of return.

In other words, there are enough critics of Pashinyan in Armenia, but those who agree with Simonyan (head of Sputnik and Rai Russian news agencies) and Zakharova are in an absolute minority in the current situation of Armenia. Including among the Armenian army, which makes a military coup in this country almost impossible. In fact, immediately after the defeat in the 2020 war, attempts were made to carry out a coup, which did not yield results.

• Many critics in They stand against the theory that Russia can punish Armenia through Azerbaijan and do not consider it possible for some reasons. Among other things, all the actions of Baku in the last few years prove that they do not follow Moscow, especially in the main issues of their foreign policy. The question of whether there will be a new war between Armenia and Azerbaijan does not yet have a clear answer, but it is Baku’s decision, not Moscow.
• In the economic sphere Most of the theories point to the destruction of the economic structures of Armenia. It gets its gas from Russia, its electricity grid is controlled by a Russian-affiliated company, its railways are owned by Russian Railways, and due to its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union, its stores are stocked with Russian goods. But the question is, to what extent Russia, which has already severed its relations with Europe, can afford to lose the remaining markets of the neighboring countries, especially in a situation where the effectiveness of such economic pressure on Armenia is doubtful, this country with Life under siege is no stranger.

In fact, Russia is currently under economic pressure on Armenia. The main road between the two countries is periodically closed through the “Vorkhni Lars” checkpoint, and Russian customs officials have created many problems for Armenians. But Armenia will definitely survive such a pressure, just as it survived the complete closure of the Upper Lares Pass in North Ossetia for a year and a half after the Russo-Georgian war.

The Moldovan Model

However, despite all the difficulties, It is difficult to imagine that the relations between Armenia and Russia can be reduced to the level of, say, Georgia. There is no conflict between these two countries, there are many people with pro-Russian views in Armenian society, Russian language and Russian media are widely spoken in this country. Therefore, Moldova seems to be a more suitable analogy for the future of Moscow-Yervan relations.

By expressing solidarity with Georgia and Ukraine, Moldova has reached a correct understanding of its position. Direct conflict with Russia, despite the uncertainty of the situation in the Dniester, does not seem a likely scenario, and since an existential choice is not required, a secure relationship can be established. Until recently, Moldova had a fairly healthy trade flow with Russia, and its current decline is the result of sanctions imposed against Russia, not a political decision. The issue of Moldova’s participation in the Commonwealth of Nations Organization, which was raised recently, did not worry anyone about this country’s membership in the club of post-Soviet countries.

The future of Armenia also depends on Most likely it will be. Trade with Russia will continue and even grow as long as the operational capacity of the upper Lares allows. People will also travel to Moscow for work until the exchange rate of the ruble against the Armenian dram makes such revenues less profitable.

Russian military base with a capacity of five thousand The soldier can continue to operate in the Gyumri region until 2044, the entire period stipulated in the agreement between the two countries, but mostly as a relic of the past, like a group of Russian troops in Transnistria.

Of course, this amount of support is much less than what Turkey has done for Azerbaijan and NATO for Ukraine, but it is still more than Russia for Armenia after 2020.

Pashinyan recently said that “Armenia never expected a military intervention from the CSTO, but first of all, we expected a political stance from Russia.” And Greece will do it better than Moscow.

Armenia’s situation is not similar to many other countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia is not the main threat to the security of Armenia because it does not have a common border with this country, but it is the main threat to Azerbaijan, and Yerevan primarily needs allies to contain the threat of Baku.

Russia is already in action. It has shown that at least it will not do this in front of Pashinyan’s government. But Europe can do much better in this regard. If there is anything that would prevent Azerbaijan from taking more drastic steps towards Armenia, it could be the reluctance to create problems for Baku’s energy exports to the European Union, or the fear of being in the Putin and Lukashenko camp.

To prevent this, Baku should remain on the western front and this issue can provide some security for Yerevan.

Researcher Mehdi Saif Tabrizi

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