Iran Seeks Differentiated Approach in Regional Conflicts Amidst Escalating Tensions
According to the International Desk of Webangah News Agency, the concept of a region has consistently been a fundamental analytical level in international relations. Due to numerous commonalities such as geographical proximity, economic exchanges, and shared religious-cultural bonds among neighbors, ‘regional convergence’ has been recognized as a strategy for coalition and alliance building to maximize the benefits for member states. In this context, Iran, by relying on its ‘neighborly policy,’ notably exemplified by the restoration of diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia, has been striving to reduce mutual distrust and foster stability through regional convergence mechanisms. When discussing the region, it is imperative to acknowledge the diverse and distinct countries and actors involved, refraining from oversimplifying them under terms like ‘Arabs’ and overlooking their differing policies, identities, and circumstances.
Despite ongoing bilateral consultations between the southern Persian Gulf states and Tehran, as well as Washington, since the end of the twelve-day war up to the Ramadan war, it appears that Netanyahu’s increasing lobbying in Washington and his persuasion of Trump regarding the possibility of achieving immediate gains from a ‘weakened Iran’ could not prevent the outbreak of war. Consequently, and in light of Iran’s prior warnings about targeting American and Zionist entity bases and interests in regional countries, Iran was compelled to target these entities, leading to a ‘regional war.’ This development could introduce threats and opportunities in the landscape of Tehran’s relations with the southern Persian Gulf, at least in the medium term.
Although diplomatic consultations are ongoing, Iran’s attacks on regional countries have thus far not been particularly convincing to officials and public opinion in those nations, who perceive them as clear violations of their national sovereignty. In other words, even as societies and politicians in these countries discuss the inadequacy of Washington’s security umbrella and the risks of continued U.S. military presence on their bases, this does not necessarily bring them closer to Iran; in fact, it might even increase Iran’s perceived securitization. Given the importance of these points and the necessity of contemplating the prospects of Iran-Arab relations during and after the war, alongside the Supreme Leader’s explicit emphasis on good neighborly relations, the following tactical and strategic suggestions are worthy of consideration:
1. Differentiate between objectives and parties to the conflict: Despite Iran’s repeated assertions of targeting American interests and infrastructure, Tehran should continue to strive for distinction among adversaries and other actors. This includes differentiating between the Zionist regime, as the primary existential enemy, and the United States. For the Persian Gulf littoral states, the primary basis for engagement should be their alignment with Hebrew and Western schemes. It appears that countries belonging to the Brotherhood bloc should be viewed differently from members of the Abraham Accords, and serious operational and diplomatic efforts should be made to avoid facing a unified front against Iran.
2. Focus on intensive official, elite, and public diplomacy: Iran should prepare a narrative supplement for each wave of attacks on Arab countries, explaining the objectives, the reasons (presence of American equipment or military personnel, or association with American economic interests), and the outlook for continuation (until these bases are used for attacks against Iran). This can prevent Iran from being perceived as a security threat to the region. In situations where tactical conditions or the battlefield make it impossible to distinguish between targets and parties to the conflict, while acknowledging the national cost, diplomatic actions in all spheres should be employed to control these costs. For instance, an attack on the Ras Laffan gas facilities in Qatar, resulting in an estimated $60 billion loss, as a country supporting Palestine and having different inclinations compared to a country like the UAE, should have been proportional to its involvement in supporting attacks against the country and the schemes of the Zionist regime and Trump, or if battlefield conditions necessitated such an operation, a strong narrative and diplomatic follow-up should have been implemented.
Conclusion: Despite the necessity of continuing attacks on American interests and bases and conducting targeted, scattered strikes against regional countries, Iran must meticulously delineate strategic and operational lines to prevent efforts to exert economic and military pressure on the United States from evolving into regional consensus-building and the negative actions of southern Persian Gulf governments against Iran. Therefore, even while implementing a ‘madman strategy’ and increasing economic-military costs for Washington, Tehran must differentiate between various objectives, gradually continuing attacks within a more targeted framework and with a more strategic vision, moving beyond emotional reactions.
