Iran’s Self-Sufficiency Fortifies Resistance Amidst US-Israel Tensions, Analyst Says
According to the International Desk of Webangah News Agency, as global public opinion grapples with the potential for renewed conflict between Iran and the United States, the future trajectory of this crisis has become a focal point for political and media circles. The situation is compounded by developments in the Strait of Hormuz, the military and economic costs of confrontation, Iran’s deterrent capabilities, and the positions of regional and international actors, elevating the confrontation beyond a bilateral dispute.
Understanding the outlook requires more than just assessing the likelihood of war or renewed negotiations. The core questions involve how recent confrontations have altered calculations in Washington and Tel Aviv, the extent of Iran’s resilience against military and political pressure, and the broader implications of this crisis for regional order and international relations.
In this context, Webangah News Agency conducted an interview with Professor Fernando Steiger, a scholar and professor at the Faculty of Journalism and Communication Sciences at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Regarding recent statements by Donald Trump about the possibility of renewed war with Iran, coupled with ongoing efforts for negotiation, how do you assess the current approach? Do you believe that the increasing costs of war will push Trump towards negotiation and an agreement with Iran, or will he continue to pursue the military option?
Trump will ultimately move towards negotiation, but he will likely engage in another military action beforehand to present any potential agreement as Iran’s surrender to the American public. This interpretation can be drawn from his October statements, where he said the issue would be resolved either peacefully or by force, and he also highlighted November 3rd as a significant date. He negotiates while also focusing on the US midterm elections.
The rising costs of war are pushing Trump toward the negotiation table. The Pentagon has stated that war costs exceeded $33 billion by June. Brown University estimates that the American public has incurred an additional $100 billion in fuel costs. Meanwhile, only 17 percent of the public is satisfied with Trump’s handling of the cost of living.
Trump initiated the war without congressional authorization, promising the conflict would last only a few weeks, ultimately acting contrary to the slogan that brought him to the White House: avoiding new wars. The cracks within the MAGA movement are now apparent.
The United States cannot reopen the Strait of Hormuz solely through military force, unless it resorts to a large-scale ground operation, which would be exceedingly difficult for Washington to sustain and support. This situation signals the decline of American hegemony: a power that still possesses destructive capabilities but faces limitations in imposing its will.
Meanwhile, Netanyahu is among the staunchest opponents of any agreement. He requires the continuation of the war to maintain his political standing and is striving to pressure Washington to prevent a negotiated settlement.
How do you assess the resistance of the Iranian people during the forty-day war and the continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran’s armed forces? What impact do you believe these two factors have had on the war calculations of the United States and its allies?
Iran’s resistance thwarted Washington and Tel Aviv’s plan to eliminate the country’s leaders and dismantle its political structure. While the Iranian leader was assassinated and the CIA attempted to organize Kurdish militias, the outcome, contrary to the designers’ expectations, was the strengthening of national cohesion and the formation of a united front within the country, encompassing even some segments of the government’s opponents.
The West has once again equated Iran with its government, whereas Iran is, above all, a nation with a deep historical memory. The people of this country have not forgotten the coup against Mohammad Mosaddegh or the eight-year war with Iraq, during which various powers supported Saddam. The attack on the Minab school, by provoking public anger, facilitated national solidarity and increased support for the government—a development no single domestic propaganda campaign could have achieved.
The Strait of Hormuz also altered the nature of the war. Iran did not necessarily need to use its navy directly to disrupt traffic in this waterway. Low-cost drones and missiles put the passage of ships at risk, and by early March, London-based insurance companies had canceled war risk coverage. Consequently, insecurity and insurance limitations effectively disrupted maritime traffic, shifting the conflict from the military arena, where the US holds an advantage, to the economic arena—an area where Washington is significantly vulnerable.
These developments dealt two blows to the United States. First, Washington’s allies did not step forward to participate in Trump’s proposed naval coalition, with Europe and Japan refraining from deploying their ships. Second, the Persian Gulf monarchies realized that hosting US military bases does not necessarily guarantee their security and could even expose them to attacks.
Meanwhile, Iran’s crude oil exports to China continued, with payments made outside the dollar system. Qalibaf has now conditioned the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz on the acceptance of seven articles of the Islamabad memorandum. In my view, this situation indicates that Tehran still plays a pivotal role in determining the conditions related to the Strait of Hormuz.
Self-reliance has been a central tenet of Iran’s national security strategy in recent decades, pursued in both military and diplomatic domains. Considering the experiences of the twelve-day and forty-day wars, how do you assess Iran’s self-reliance? To what extent has this strategy preserved Iran’s capacity for resistance and decision-making independence against US and Israeli pressures?
Self-sufficiency is one of the primary factors in Iran’s continued resistance. The country, which faced difficulties even in procuring spare parts for its aircraft during the war with Iraq and has endured four decades of sanctions, concluded that technological dependence can lead to political dependence. Therefore, it made the development of its domestic defense industry a priority.
Iran’s Ministry of Defense has announced that the country’s military production has doubled between the twelve-day war and this year’s conflict, with self-sufficiency reaching over 90 percent. Conversely, some Western analysts believe that aerial attacks have seriously damaged Iran’s military capabilities. Nevertheless, during the forty-day war, Iran continued to launch missiles even after the assassination of its commanders, and its missiles managed to bypass Israeli air defense systems in the Dimona region.
Seven months later, the United States continues to send its aircraft carriers to the region. This indicates that Washington still considers Iran’s military capability a serious factor in its calculations, though the mere deployment of aircraft carriers is insufficient to assess the extent of damage to Iran’s arsenal.
In the diplomatic sphere, the same logic of self-reliance is evident. Iran was not dependent on the direct involvement of Russia or China to continue the war and pursue negotiations, instead charting its diplomatic course through chosen intermediaries, first Pakistan and then Qatar.
Tehran has also sought to define its negotiation priorities: first, the issue of the Strait of Hormuz, and then the nuclear file. Within this framework, Iran aims to set the negotiation agenda, and the United States is compelled to adjust its positions in response to these priorities.
Javier Milei, the President of Argentina, has been one of the most vocal supporters of the United States and Israel in the war against Iran. In your view, to what extent is this alignment an ideological and personal choice for Milei, and how much does it represent a lasting shift in Argentina’s foreign policy? Could this approach draw Argentina into a conflict beyond its direct interests, and what would be the consequences for Buenos Aires’ standing in Latin America and its relations with the Global South?
This approach has both ideological and structural roots. Javier Milei has a personal and intellectual connection with Israel, partly stemming from his proximity to the Chabad Lubavitch Hasidic Jewish movement. During his trips to New York, visiting the tomb of Menachem Mendel Schneerson, the spiritual leader of this movement, has become a fixed ritual. Rabbi Axel Wahnish, Milei’s spiritual guide, is also an influential figure on him; he is the individual Milei appointed as Argentina’s ambassador to Israel.
These religious and belief-based inclinations explain some of Milei’s hardline stances, from expressing pleasure at the assassination of Khamenei to describing Trump and Netanyahu as heroes of humanity.
However, Argentina’s alignment with global dominant powers is not a new phenomenon. The country’s ruling classes have consistently sought to strengthen their ties with the hegemonic power. Carlos Menem also dispatched Argentine warships to the Persian Gulf in 1990.
What is significant today is the coincidence of this inclination with the US effort to reconfigure its presence in the Americas, the so-called “Donner” project, and the competition for strategic resources, including lithium and vital minerals. The establishment of a naval base in Ushuaia, joint exercises with the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz, Argentina’s request to become a NATO Global Partner, and the designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization are all to be examined within the framework of this orientation.
The risk of Argentina being drawn into this conflict is serious. Pablo Quierno, the country’s Foreign Minister, has not ruled out the possibility of sending ships to the Persian Gulf, and Milei has called Iran an enemy of Argentina. The experience of the 1990s should serve as a historical warning for Buenos Aires: Argentina took sides in the Persian Gulf War, and subsequently, in 1992 and 1994, witnessed terrorist attacks on its own soil.
At the regional level, Milei is no longer alone. Washington is forming an alliance of right-wing governments in Latin America that, in addition to the US, also aligns with Israel. In my view, this trend weakens the independence and collective power of Latin America, precisely when the world’s movement towards a multipolar order presents new opportunities to strengthen national sovereignty and operational independence for countries.
The implications of this policy for Argentina’s relations with the Global South are also significant. The Milei government has opted out of joining BRICS, sided with the US and Israel in a UN vote on slavery and its reparations, expelled Iran’s charge d’affaires, and found itself in opposition to a bloc of countries that includes China, Argentina’s second-largest trading partner.
Milei has repeatedly emphasized that Argentina’s alliance with the US and Israel is based on shared values; however, critics argue that this policy makes Argentina increasingly dependent on Washington. Does Milei’s unconditional support for the US and Israeli war against Iran not undermine Argentina’s strategic independence in the long run?
Yes, this process is already underway. The emphasis on shared values has, in practice, become an ideological cover for political dependence, the effects of which can be observed in the Argentine government’s decisions.
The issue of the Malvinas Islands, which Britain calls the Falklands, is a clear example of this contradiction. The “Sea Lion” oil project in the waters around these islands, which Argentina claims sovereignty over, is proceeding with the participation of British and Israeli companies. Thus, Israel, which Milei calls a brotherly ally, is involved in exploiting regional resources over which sovereignty remains contested.
Trump’s reference to a possible shift in the US stance on the Malvinas Islands also lacks clear support. The United States supported Britain in the 1982 war, and London remains one of Washington’s closest allies in NATO.
This dependence is not limited to foreign policy and is also evident in the economic and financial spheres. Financial support from the US Treasury for Argentina in 2025 was linked to the outcome of the country’s elections, a point Trump himself has publicly discussed. When a government accepts external financial support being tied to its election results and internal political developments, its decision-making independence is constrained.
Strategic autonomy, in the political tradition of Juan Perón, means making decisions based on national interests and expanding relations with diverse partners, rather than exclusive dependence on a foreign power.
Argentina, with its lithium reserves, oil and gas resources in the Vaca Muerta region extracted through hydraulic fracturing, territorial claims in Antarctica, and extensive maritime expanse in the South Atlantic, possesses significant potential to play an independent role on the international stage. Such a country should be able to negotiate with Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and the Arab and Persian Gulf countries based on its national interests and expand its relations with a diverse range of powers.
However, Milei has chosen another path: linking Argentina’s strategic future to a single power and accompanying it in a war that is not directly related to Argentina’s national interests.
