US Strategy to Undermine Hezbollah Deemed Failed: Analysis of Economic and Social Pressure Tactics
According to the International Desk of Webangah News Agency, a Lebanese newspaper, Al-Akhbar, has published details of a U.S. National Security Council document titled “How to Get Rid of Hezbollah,” which was presented to the Donald Trump administration. The plan advocated for a transition to a “maximum pressure” policy against the resistance community through economic sanctions and denial of services, coupled with a policy of offering “economic and social incentives” through the Lebanese government.
The authors of this document identified the attempt to “sever the link between Hezbollah and its support base” as the primary driver for this plan. To achieve this, a series of measures were proposed, most notably prioritizing residents of southern Lebanon for reconstruction, compensation, and services, alongside restoring bank deposits and creating employment opportunities. The United States believed these actions could gradually reduce the reliance of the Shiite community on Hezbollah’s social service network.
The document also called for avoiding “punitive and humiliating discourse” against Hezbollah supporters while isolating its military and security core. The U.S. strategy was based on the misconception that the resistance base had been depleted by wars and crises, and that if the government were truly capable of reconstruction, compensation, and service provision, the group might reconsider its political stances and options.
The United States had previously employed similar models in various countries, including Japan, Germany, and Northern Ireland, and sought to apply them in Lebanon without considering the differences within these societies. However, the document acknowledged the limitations of comparing Lebanon to other nations, admitting that disparities in the political, social, and historical structures of these countries made replicating the experiences of Germany, Japan, and Northern Ireland in Lebanon impossible.
Despite this acknowledgment of limitations, the proposed actions did not reflect this understanding, with the document’s authors reverting to “old prescriptions.” The concept discussed involved “Indianization” and “Palestinianization” of Lebanon, a notion also explored by Palestinian thinker Munir Al-Akesh in his analysis of the American colonial experience. The basis of this policy was to erase the cultural and historical identity of a society, similar to Native Americans, and reconstruct their collective memory to normalize colonization and instill a sense of shame regarding their original identity. In this model, cultural heritage is preserved solely as “folklore” without connection to the historical and political rights of its owners, aiming to create individuals who accept colonization as an irreversible reality and cease struggling for their national rights and historical identity.
Under this approach, Palestinians would not necessarily have to completely abandon their national identity; rather, the goal would be to gradually reorder their priorities so that maintaining economic and social stability and guaranteeing daily living conditions become more important than demanding national rights or continuing the struggle.
The elements outlined in the American document are not new; they align largely with ideas and approaches previously proposed by Zionist researchers and officials to weaken Hezbollah and diminish its ties with its social environment. However, the calculations of Lebanese and Palestinian society revealed the limitations of this plan, as improvements in certain economic conditions did not lead to an end to resistance in Palestinian society.
A study published by the Institute for National Security Studies of the Zionist regime in 2009 emphasized that expanded economic cooperation and growth in the West Bank did not necessarily lead to a change in the fundamental beliefs of Palestinians or their perspective on the struggle. Israeli researcher Dani Bar-On, in a book published in 2007, proposed policies to weaken the “deep-rooted popular power of resistance,” focusing on two main axes: first, strengthening the institutions of the Lebanese government through regional and international support to gradually expand its presence and impose limitations on Hezbollah; and second, weakening the social bond between the party and its followers by reducing the party’s economic capacity and undermining the support and service networks that solidify its presence in society.
After nearly two decades, this approach resurfaced in a June 2026 study by former U.S. diplomat Jeffrey Willement at the Brookings Institution. Willement reproduced the same logic, arguing that weakening Hezbollah’s political and social base requires demonstrating the Lebanese government’s ability to provide services, job opportunities, and security in ways that exceed what Hezbollah offers.
Historical experiences, however, raise serious questions about the accuracy of this approach. Previous experiences in Palestine and Lebanon have shown that national affiliation is not merely an “economic benefit,” and the relationship of societies with their ideals is not solely defined by income and services. Thus, approaches inspired by the experiences of Germany, Japan, and Northern Ireland are contradictory to the realities and historical, social, and political structures of Palestine and Lebanon. Changes in living conditions and the provision of economic alternatives do not necessarily equate to a shift in political consciousness or an abandonment of choices shaped over decades of struggle and historical experience.
