US Repeats Failed Cuba Strategy, Ignoring Regional Dynamics and Empowering Rivals

According to the International Desk of Webangah News Agency, the enduring U.S. policy of pressure, blockade, and intervention in the affairs of independent nations is starkly exemplified by Cuba. This strategy, persisting for over six decades through sanctions and confrontation, has neither yielded the political changes Washington desires nor narrowed the divide between the two countries.

Recent threats from U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio against Havana, emphasizing the need for change in Cuba, signal Washington’s return to an old logic of coercion. This approach prioritizes economic pressure over diplomacy and external determination of Cuba’s political path, disregarding the Cuban people’s right to self-determination.

Observers suggest this repeated approach reflects Washington’s inability to move beyond a policy whose human, regional, and geopolitical consequences have been repeatedly demonstrated, rather than a novel strategy.

Historical Interventions and the Repetition of a Failed Regime Change Strategy

The conflict between Washington and Havana predates the 1959 revolution. The United States considered Cuba within its sphere of influence from the country’s early independence. The Platt Amendment further enabled U.S. intervention in Cuba’s internal affairs, limiting its sovereignty and fostering the perception that Havana’s political direction must align with U.S. interests.

Following the revolution, the methods evolved, but the logic of intervention remained. Pressure on refineries, cessation of sugar quotas, economic embargoes, the Bay of Pigs operation, and sabotage efforts were all aimed at weakening or changing the Cuban government. However, these actions proved counterproductive, solidifying the revolutionary government, enhancing internal security, and drawing Havana closer to the Soviet Union.

Even six decades of sanctions have failed to establish Washington’s preferred political structure in Cuba. Conversely, external pressure has enabled the Cuban government to frame domestic problems within the context of a U.S. threat, transforming resistance to Washington into a component of its political legitimacy.

Despite this, the U.S. persists with this policy because the Cuba issue is not solely governed by foreign policy calculations. The influence of hardline groups in Florida, electoral considerations, and the historical legacy of dominance in Latin America increase the cost for U.S. administrations to retreat from sanctions. In this environment, failures are attributed not to policy ineffectiveness but to insufficient pressure, leading to recommendations for further sanctions and threats.

Economic Sanctions: Pressuring the Government or Transferring Costs to Society?

The designation of the state-owned Unión Eléctrica de Cuba (CUPET) on the U.S. sanctions list extends beyond merely restricting a government entity. CUPET plays a pivotal role in fuel import, refining, storage, and distribution. Disruptions to its operations directly impact electricity production, transportation, hospitals, agriculture, and food preservation. Recent widespread power outages have demonstrated how, in a country grappling with fuel shortages and an aging power grid, pressure on the energy sector rapidly escalates into a social crisis.

The contradiction in Washington’s policy becomes more apparent as the U.S. simultaneously claims to support Cuba’s private sector. While U.S. companies sought to supply fuel to Cuban private businesses in the early months of the year, the transfer and storage of that fuel were inevitably reliant on infrastructure managed by CUPET. Sanctioning this company effectively blocked a pathway intended to alleviate energy shortages for the private sector, thereby depriving the very entrepreneurs it purported to support of the means to operate.

The reach of this pressure is not confined within U.S. borders. Placing a company on the Treasury Department’s sanctions list exposes banks, insurance companies, shipping firms, and foreign suppliers to the risk of losing access to the U.S. market and financial system. Consequently, many non-U.S. actors refrain from engaging in transactions with Cuba. In this regard, Washington not only pressures Havana but also effectively influences the economic decisions of third countries through its domestic laws, a matter consistently met with widespread opposition at the United Nations General Assembly.

This pressure has intensified precisely as Cuba has implemented an unprecedented series of economic reforms, including permitting private banks, direct foreign trade, and increased participation of non-state investors. However, such reforms require access to banking, capital, insurance, and energy to have a real impact. Sanctions, therefore, hinder rather than foster the reform environment, conveying the message that even economic opening is insufficient without political change aligned with Washington’s preferences.

Regional and Geopolitical Consequences: Pressuring Cuba and Weakening U.S. Influence

Strategically, Cuba is more than just a small neighbor in the Caribbean for Washington; it has become a symbolic test of U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere. For this reason, Havana’s political independence and the continuation of a government at odds with Washington’s desires are perceived within American calculations as a challenge to the regional order. Recent threats regarding potential intervention also send a message to other Latin American governments that political divergence with Washington may be met with economic pressure, isolation, or even military threats.

However, such displays of power do not necessarily enhance U.S. influence. Pressuring Cuba revives the region’s historical sensitivity to foreign intervention and the logic of “spheres of influence,” motivating more independent governments to diversify their relationships. The broad opposition at the UN General Assembly to the Cuban blockade indicates that Washington faces more diplomatic isolation in defending this policy than Havana does. UN human rights experts have also characterized the fuel blockade as a threat to the fundamental rights of the Cuban people, a criticism that undermines the legitimacy of America’s claims to support the country’s population.

Some experts believe a more significant consequence is the creation of greater space for China. Beijing has openly supported Cuban sovereignty against what it terms foreign intervention, concurrently becoming a primary source of technology and capital for the country’s energy sector. China’s contribution to developing over a thousand megawatts of solar capacity allows Havana to reduce its reliance on fuel imports to some extent. Consequently, a policy designed to isolate Cuba and diminish U.S. rivals’ influence effectively transforms Beijing into a more essential partner for Cuba.

Therefore, the core issue is no longer solely the future of the Cuban government but the cost Washington incurs to maintain the credibility of its regional dominance. Continued pressure may yield electoral benefits in U.S. domestic politics and project an image of resolve, but strategically, it erodes Latin American trust, expands China’s influence, and escalates the Cuban crisis from a bilateral dispute into a theater of great power competition.

The U.S. repeats this strategy because it views retreating from it as accepting limitations on its influence. Yet, the ultimate paradox lies here: the insistence on demonstrating power in Cuba gradually depletes the very power and influence Washington seeks to preserve.