Turkey-Israel Tensions Simmer Amid Regional Power Shifts; Expert Downplays Direct Conflict
According to the International Desk of Webangah News Agency, an Israeli airstrike on the “Abu Dhuhur” airbase in Idlib has reignited tensions between Ankara and Tel Aviv. While Israel justified the action by claiming Turkey‘s military presence in Syria posed a threat to its security, Ankara strongly refuted this assertion and reacted sharply to the attack.
Despite speculation about potential hidden communication channels between Ankara and Tel Aviv, the strike on Abu Dhuhur is not expected to be the end of the friction between the two sides in Syria. Tel Aviv has increasingly portrayed Turkey as a security threat. The key question remains whether Turkey’s rising prominence as a “threat” in Tel Aviv’s strategy will lead to intensified tensions and reciprocal actions in Syria, or if the United States will mediate a de-escalation mechanism.
In this context, Mehr News Agency conducted a detailed interview with Professor Dr. Celalettin Yavuz, a retired Rear Admiral from the Turkish Naval Staff. Yavuz noted that while Israeli officials are issuing threats against Turkey, Israeli media attempts to portray Turkey as an “existential threat.” He stated that Israel has become a destabilizing force in the region, posing significant dangers to the region’s political and economic stability and disregarding international norms.
Yavuz observed that the United States is no longer capable of orchestrating regional stability, a role it once held. This decline in U.S. influence, both militarily and politically, has been evident, with Iran’s resilience and defensive solidarity being key factors in exposing this weakness. Regarding Israel’s perception of Turkey as an existential threat, Yavuz asserted that Iran has long been considered the primary existential threat, particularly after former Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s statement that “Israel must be wiped off the map.”
He recalled that the current Justice and Development Party (AKP) government initially had a positive stance toward Israel, with plans for a joint industrial zone in Gaza. However, Israel’s “disproportionate and heavy” 22-day offensive on Gaza in late 2008, launched shortly after a meeting between then-Israeli Prime Minister and then-Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Ankara, significantly angered Turkey.
Subsequent events, including the “One Minute” incident between Erdoğan and Shimon Peres in Davos in early 2009 and the Mavi Marmara incident on May 31, 2010, where Israeli commandos attacked a civilian aid convoy en route to Gaza, killing nine people, marked a turning point. Since then, despite occasional improvements, Turkish-Israeli political relations have remained tense and critical.
Yavuz highlighted Turkey’s strong reactions to recent events in Gaza, attacks on Lebanon, Israeli actions in Syria, and joint U.S.-Israeli missile and air strikes against Iran, which Turkey deemed contrary to international law. He noted Turkey’s successful global campaign to brand Israel as a “purulent abscess and the main destabilizer of the region.”
He explained that direct military action by Israel against Turkey is improbable due to several factors. Firstly, Turkey’s geographical proximity allows for robust reciprocal air and naval responses. Secondly, Turkey is a NATO member, and the U.S. would oppose a conflict between Israel and a key NATO ally, which would benefit Washington’s rivals like Russia and China. Pushing a powerful and capable Turkey towards the Eastern bloc is not in the interest of the U.S. or Europe, especially given recent European stances favoring Greece-South Cyprus and sanctions against Ankara.
Yavuz added that a “Joint Defense Pact” was recently signed in Mecca among Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. This pact could provide Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence as a safeguard for Turkey should Israel resort to nuclear threats. He dismissed the notion that Israel’s strike near the Turkish border in Syria was acceptable, citing Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights and its expansion of occupied territory. Turkey has condemned this occupation and advocated for Israel’s immediate withdrawal through international organizations.
He stated that Turkey’s response to the recent strike would remain diplomatic and political, as it was not a direct attack on Turkish soil or forces in Syria. Yavuz believes that Israel, particularly Netanyahu, intended to send a message to Turkey with this strike. However, Turkey’s response would not involve targeting a base near Israel in Syria, given Syria’s government is an ally and Turkey supports its stability.
Turkey will work through diplomatic channels, the UN, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to delegitimize Israel’s actions. Yavuz also noted that despite NATO membership, Turkey recognizes the diminishing efficacy of the alliance, a sentiment echoed in the formation of the Mecca defense pact. He cited unpredictable U.S. presidential behaviors, like Trump’s, and decades of waiting for EU membership as reasons for Turkey seeking new security options.
He mentioned that Turkey has prioritized strengthening its defense capabilities, particularly its multi-layered air defense system, often referred to as the “Iron Dome” (Çelik Kubbe). Recent missile orders worth nearly $800 million to Aselsan and the construction of advanced warships underscore this focus.
Regarding the analysis that Israel aims to prevent the delivery of F-35 fighter jets to Turkey by provoking a limited conflict, Yavuz acknowledged that the U.S. Congress has not yet officially approved the F-35 delivery, with strong opposition from Israeli, Jewish, and Greek lobbies. He believes the U.S. government is unlikely to take decisive action in this regard currently. While Trump has made statements, his positions are unstable, and even previously requested F-16 modernization equipment from the Biden administration has not been delivered.
Yavuz confirmed that if signs of Washington’s willingness to sell F-35s emerge, Turkey would not engage in conflict. However, if lobbies in Congress solidify the narrative of Ankara being an increasing threat to Israel, they could indeed hinder the F-35 deal. He described the Eastern Mediterranean as a highly competitive arena since 2007, starting with the Greek Cypriot administration’s oil and gas exploration licenses without considering Turkish Cypriot rights. Turkey has drawn its continental shelf and maritime borders and deployed naval forces.
Yavuz noted the formation of a bloc comprising Israel, Greece, and South Cyprus, with occasional Egyptian support, during a period of strained Turkish relations with Egypt and Arab countries. The UAE’s involvement through supporting Haftar’s forces in Libya also added to the complexity. He explained that while Greece and South Cyprus attempted to impose the “Seville map” as maritime borders via the EU, Turkey countered this by signing a maritime border delimitation agreement with Libya in 2019, although Greece later reached a separate agreement with Egypt.
Currently, major American, French, and Italian oil companies are also involved in gas and electricity projects in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey has adjusted its relations with both power structures in Libya and has active drone presence. Yavuz emphasized Turkey’s vital strategy of fully aligning Egypt with its goals in the Eastern Mediterranean, noting that European nations, while verbally supporting Athens and Nicosia, cannot ignore Turkey’s naval and political power.
He added that President Erdoğan has repeatedly called for the official recognition of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” at the UN General Assembly and is expected to reiterate this demand. Yavuz urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to recognize the independence of Northern Cyprus, highlighting Turkey’s consistent support for Iran in fair causes and emphasizing that the border demarcation in Cyprus has brought peace, contrasting it with pre-1974 conflicts and assimilation attempts against Turks.
Yavuz confirmed that countering Israeli threats in the region is a significant, though not exclusive, motivation behind Turkey signing the Mecca pact. He reiterated that the declining effectiveness of NATO, Ankara’s loss of trust in the EU and the U.S., and growing mistrust have driven Turkey towards these new defense convergences.
